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Introduction 
 On the morning of February 4, 1976, a devastating 7.5 magnitude earthquake hit Guatemala. 
Twenty-three thousand people were killed and more than seventy-six thousand people suffered injuries. 
Within days, Protestant churches in the United States responded by sending disaster relief such as food, 
clothing, and medical aid to help suffering Guatemalans.1 Churches not only sent material assistance, 
but they also sent missionaries. In this manner, the earthquake triggered an “evangelical expansion,” a 
spiritual bequest from the U.S. to a small, predominantly Catholic country in Central America in the 
midst of a long-lasting civil war. An assistant professor of history at Trinity University, Lauren Frances 
Turek states, “Ultimately, the extent and success of the evangelistic outreach that the earthquake 
triggered turned Guatemala into one of the most Protestant nations in Latin America, a transformation 
that had profound implications for Guatemalan society and politics.”2 The 1976 earthquake marked a 
turning point in the Guatemalan Civil War, but not for the reasons we commonly assume. 
The Guatemalan Civil War started in the 1960s and ended only in 1996. Many thousands 
more Guatemalans were killed as a result of the conflict than the 1976 earthquake. The Commission for 
Historical Clarification (CEH) organized by the United Nations estimates that the number of persons 
killed or disappeared during it reached a total of over 200,000. As I will show in this thesis, evangelical 
efforts from the U.S. greatly influenced the course of the Guatemalan Civil War, especially during Efraín 
                                                
1 Lauren Frances Turek, “To Support a ‘Brother in Christ’: Evangelical Groups and U.S.-Guatemalan 
Relations during the Ríos Montt Regime.” Diplomatic History 39, no.4 (2015): 692. 
2 Ibid., 693. 
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Ríos Montt’s presidency, from March 23, 1982, to August 8, 1983. The CEH reported that more than 
10,000 human rights violations and acts of violence were committed during this time, making it one of 
the most violent periods of the entire Guatemalan Civil War. CEH also concludes that 88.33 % of the 
identified victims of these crimes were of the Mayan peoples. Furthermore, CEH found that the state, 
with the help of state-sanctioned actors, was responsible for 93% of these human rights violations, while 
guerrilla activities accounted for only 3% of them. These facts suggest that state violence mostly targeted 
Mayan peoples, who are amongst the most poor in Guatemala.  
Ríos Montt was the first “born-again” Protestant president of Guatemala. He was a member of 
the Church El Verbo, which is associated with the Gospel Outreach organization based in California. 
Furthermore, his dictatorship was supported politically and financially by various Pentecostal churches 
in the U.S., which were tightly connected to Ronald Reagan’s administration. My research examines 
how Christian evangelicalism gained increasing political power in the U.S. as well as how 
American-born evangelicalism entered Guatemalan social life after the 1976 earthquake and became a 
powerful ideology, one which served to intensify state violence against Mayan peoples during Ríos 
Montt’s dictatorship. 
Guatemala is typically thought of as a predominantly Catholic country. But in recent decades, 
Protestant, and specifically evangelical, faiths have made inroads into Guatemala’s social and spiritual 
fabric. As previously mentioned, the biggest catalyst for Protestantism’s rise was the devastating 
earthquake that struck Guatemala in 1976. According to the survey data collected by San Carlos 
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University in Guatemala in 1989, evangelical efforts, such as sending material assistance with the 
missionaries, helped expand the Protestant population in the country by 14 percent between 1976 and 
1978, and by 42 percent between 1978 and 1982. By 1982, over 22 percent of the total Guatemalan 
population belonged to a Protestant church.3 
Reflecting on the class structure and historical context of Guatemala, it must be pointed out 
that Mayan peoples have suffered from institutionalized discrimination since the colonial era. As many 
scholars have argued, “The Guatemalan state has existed since its inception to promote a racist ideology 
that legitimates and empowers ladinos and others (including the planter class and foreign interests) at the 
expense of the indigenous peoples.” 4  Guatemala is a predominantly agrarian country. Its 
products—sugar, cotton, and bananas, for example—are in great demand in international markets. But 
the accumulation of capital produced by such markets has been controlled by the elites, who view 
indigenous peoples as little more than an impediment to their financial interests. Since the colonial era, 
Oscar Roland Sierra Pop argued, a majority of the Guatemalan population has been deprived of their 
lands by a minority.5  
The Mayan peoples in Guatemala have been economically, socially, and culturally 
marginalized before the Guatemalan Civil War, but during the war it reached a historical peak with what 
                                                
3 Ibid., 695. 
4 Virginia Garrard‐Burnett, Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit: Guatemala Under General Efrain 
Ríos Montt, 1982-1983 (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2010), 15. 
5 Oscar Rolando Sierra Pop, “The Church and Social Conflicts in Guatemala.” Social Compass 30, no. 
2-3 (1983), 318. 
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amounted to the attempted eradication of Mayan peoples and their cultures. The CEH states: 
“Aggression was directed against elements of profound symbolic significance for the Mayan culture, as 
in the case of the destruction of corn and the killing of their elders. These events had a serious impact on 
certain elements of Mayan identity and disturbed the transmission of their culture from generation to 
generation.”6 As an ultimate act of racism—an act of cultural genocide, in fact—the Guatemalan army 
attempted to destroy Mayan communities by desecrating the spiritual representation of Mayan identity, 
and denying it to future generations. A professor at the University of Texas at Austin, Virginia 
Garrard-Burnett states, “[t]he sharp focus of violence on Mayan people during the early 1980s has given 
rise to the phrase ‘the Mayan holocaust.’”7 It is in this context that the thesis of paper is that there was a 
complicit relationship of religion and politics in the Guatemalan Civil War that was supported by 
American evangelicals. This relationship influenced the President of the U.S. and President of 
Guatemala and led to the Mayan holocaust. In the following pages, I will examine how Christian 
activism became increasingly conservative and gained political influence in the U.S. before it was then 
exported to Guatemala, where it eventually influenced the Ríos Montt regime. I will show how 
conservative evangelicals in the U.S. were mobilized for national politics before Ronald Reagan came 
into power, and how their influence eventually shaped the Ríos Montt regime. 
                                                
6 The Commission for Historical Clarification. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Tz’Inil Na ‘Tab ‘Al: 
Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification, Conclusions and Recommendations. 
(Guatemala: CEH, 1998), 30. 
7 Garrard-Burnett, Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit, 7. 
 6 
Throughout most of the twentieth century, much of U.S. Christian activism had been 
informed by a reform-minded, tolerant, and liberal outlook.8 At a certain point, however, this began to 
change, and a distinctly conservative strain of evangelical belief emerged. The rise of Gospel Outreach 
is a case in point. Gospel Outreach is the mother church of El Verbo, the church to which Ríos Montt 
belongs. Both churches are politically very conservative, but Gospel Outreach grew out of the Jesus 
Movement, a countercultural phenomenon that swept across the U.S. in the late 1960s and the early 
1970s. The Jesus Movement resonated with free-spirited, countercultural Americans, including the 
Beat Generation and, later, the hippie movement, which faded by the mid-1970s. It is important to 
understand why, and how, a seemingly tolerant, liberal variant of Christianity transformed into such a 
conservative ideology. What was once a theology associated with hippies had transformed and was 
used by a dictator this is responsible for authorizing atrocities. How did the movement of “love and 
peace” in the U.S. becomes associated with the rise of the Christian Right. Guatemala provides a case 
study in which it is possible to view the implications of how the Jesus Movement underwent a dramatic 
transformation in connection with the rise of the Christian Right, which includes influential 
televangelists Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell. In doing so, I hope to reveal the process by which 
evangelicals became politicized in the U.S. and how they became complicit with Ronald Reagan’s 
administration, which through its backing of Ríos Montt fostered and supported the Mayan genocide. 
                                                
8 Ibid., 159. 
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Evangelicals increased their religious and political presence in Guatemala first by 
participating in the reconstruction efforts after the 1976 earthquake, then by infiltrating the Guatemalan 
educational system, which influenced the nation’s politics. Evangelicals had considerable help, both 
from the U.S. and Guatemala. U.S. evangelicals, with their connections to the Reagan administration, had 
gained political capital, which allowed them to offer support to Guatemalan elites who backed the repressive 
policies of the Ríos Montt regime. This was in opposition to some parts of the Catholic Church, which sided with 
the poor. In a radical departure from the previous 500 years of Catholic teaching, liberation theology, by 1976, had 
put the some aspects of Catholic theology at odds with goals and aspirations of the conservative elite in 
Guatemala. 
As for the connection between the Catholic Church and politics in Latin America, it is worth 
pointing out that even after the independence from Spain in the early nineteenth century, “the Catholic 
clergy enjoyed considerable political authority.”9 In the second half of the twentieth century, this 
authority was challenged by a new Catholic movement for the poor, liberation theology. Peruvian priest 
and theologian Gustavo Gutiérrez, who is the chief advocate of liberation theology states:  
The theology of liberation attempts to reflect on the experience and meaning of the faith 
based on the commitment to abolish injustice and to build a new society; this theology must 
be verified by the practice of that commitment, by active, effective participation in the 
struggle which the exploited social classes have undertaken against their oppressors. 
                                                
9 David Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant?: The Politics of Evangelical Growth (Berkley and 
Los Angels: University of California Press, 1990), 25. 
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Liberation from every form of exploitation, the possibility of a more human and dignified 
life, the creation of a new humankind—all pass through this struggle.10   
Liberation theology aimed to encourage the Catholic Church to engage positively in politics on behalf 
of the marginalized poor. In this regard, it had an affinity with Marxism, but its influence was limited in 
Guatemala. As Garrard-Burnett argues: 
Unlike neighboring El Salvador, in Guatemala, the Catholic Church at large, led by a 
conservative archbishop, never endorsed Liberation Theology. And, unlike in Nicaragua, 
Liberation Theology attracted few influential members of the native clergy in Guatemala. 
On the other hand, many foreign priests, who made up the great majority of Guatemalan’s 
clergy, embraced Liberation Theology with enthusiasm.11 
Even though liberation theology was a small, unofficial sect within Catholicism, the fact that liberation 
theology in Guatemala was largely supported by foreign clergies must have troubled the government, 
which perhaps explains the strong suspicion displayed by the government toward Catholic Churches in 
the rural highlands. For some in the army, the foreign priests too easily embraced communist guerrillas 
influenced by foreign revolutionary forces. This suspicion intensified counterinsurgency campaigns not 
only against guerrillas but also against Catholic Churches located in the highlands.  
 In addition, class politics were at play as well. As anthropologist David Stoll points out: 
                                                
10 Gustavo Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation (15th Anniversary 
Edition)(New York: Orbis Books, 1988), 174. 
11 Virginia Garrard‐Burnett, Protestantism in Guatemala: Living in the New Jerusalem (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1998), 128-129. 
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“Liberation theology was certain to antagonize conservative Catholics in the middle and upper classes, 
the pillars of the church in former times, and especially military officers.”12 In the Guatemalan class 
structure, liberation theology was regarded as a rebellion against the ruling class, including the army 
officers who were mostly conservative Catholics. These class considerations likely exacerbated the 
bloody persecution against Catholic Churches in Guatemalan highlands.  
It was in this context that evangelical faiths found their way to Guatemala. The New York 
Times suggested saw it coming: “[t]aking advantage of the complacency of Catholic hierarchies, the 
shortage of Catholic priests and the church’s controversial activist stance, evangelical churches have 
multiplied over the past decade in Latin America.”13 Although liberation theology was a minority 
movement within the Catholic Church, the actions of the Guatemalan army and ruling elites suggest 
that, in the highlands, they thought that many priests were under its influence. The dysfunction of 
Catholic Churches did not help to refute the suspicions of the army.  
The Recovery of Historical Memory Project (REMHI) suggests, “[t]here is no question that 
a sector of the Catholic church, inspired by liberation theology, played a crucial role in the cresting 
revolutionary movement in the late seventies.”14 Thereby, Catholic Churches were regarded as hotbeds 
                                                
12 David Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant?, 38. 
13 Marlise Simons, “LATIN AMERICA’S NEW GOSPEL,” The New York Times, November 7, 1982, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/07/magazine/latin-america-s-new-gospel.html?pagewanted=all 
14 Archdiocese of Guatemala (REHMI). Guatemala, Never Again!: Recovery of the Historical 
Memory Project, the Official Report of the Human Rights Office (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis 
Books, 1999), 225. 
 10 
of guerrillas and were subjected to attacks. When Ríos Montt came to power, “the persecution of priests 
decreased at the same time that Catholic Action activists and catechists were bloodily repressed.”15  
It is my hope that focusing primarily on the strain of evangelical belief that can be found in 
the Ríos Montt regime may serve as a foundation for further research in these other areas. I aim to 
identify the mechanism by which religion intensifies political violence when it is connected with 
dictatorship, a phenomenon that, sadly, extends well beyond the case of Guatemala. By focusing on the 
development of evangelical rhetoric both in U.S. and Guatemala, I hope to show how it was used to 
justify mass killing in Guatemala. This will clarify how American evangelical belief supported the 
military objectives of the Ríos Montt regime. 
In this thesis, the first section will clarify how the 1976 earthquake became a catalyst in the 
importing of American-born evangelicalism into Guatemalan society, which ultimately found political 
influence. The second section will explore the emergence of evangelicals in U.S. society and politics 
before and during the time of the “culture wars.” It also examines how U.S. evangelical rhetoric 
described and interpreted communism’s expansion in Central America. This section shows how 
evangelicals were mobilized as a powerful political force in the United States. Led by televangelists, 
like Jerry Falwell, to support Republican candidate Ronald Reagan, who maintained a strong 
anticommunist position, evangelicals played a crucial role in transforming elections. For example, they 
helped bring Reagan a landslide victory in the presidential election of 1981. The third section examines 
                                                
15 Ibid., 240. 
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how a freedom-worshiping, counterculture-created Hippie Movement transformed into a kind of 
political fundamentalism via the Jesus Movement. By drawing upon the example of influential 
evangelical thinker Francis Schaeffer, who claimed that Christian moral values should be reflected in 
national politics, this section will clarify how Schaeffer brought counterculture Christians and the 
political Right together, creating a coalition that supported Reagan administration. Building on this 
foundation, the fourth section explores the first born-again Guatemalan President Ríos Montt’s 
dictatorship. I focus specifically on how he incorporated evangelical belief into Guatemalan politics. 
Examining his evangelical rhetoric, which he used to justify political violence, especially against 
Mayan peoples, reveals the deep religious and political connections between American evangelicals 
and Ríos Montt’s regime. The fifth and final section looks deeper into this connection and shows how 
American evangelicals supported Ríos Montt’s regime financially, more than even Ronald Reagan’s 
administration had during the Cold War. 
 12 
Disaster Evangelicalism after the 1976 Earthquake 
As mentioned in the introduction, the massive earthquake that hit Guatemala in 1976 
resulted in widespread damage to the country. Making matters worse, the Guatemalan government was 
virtually useless in the reconstruction required after it. Governmental inaction opened up a space for 
foreign aid to flow into Guatemala. In this section, I will clarify how the earthquake became a catalyst 
for the importing of American-born evangelicalism into the Guatemalan society, resulting in its 
increased political influence.  
According to a novelist and scholar Arturo Arias, the central government was “practically 
incapacitated from responding to the emergency and the need for national reconstruction.” Therefore 
local assemblies “negotiated directly for aid with international agencies.”16 This desperation led the 
incapable Guatemalan authorities to allow the intervention of the U.S.-born Protestantism into 
Guatemalan society. This triggered the dramatic growth of Protestantism in the country, which up until 
that point had been overwhelmingly Catholic. But the tide was turning. In November 1982, three quarters 
of a million Protestants gathered in the capital to celebrate 100 years of Protestantism in Guatemala.17 By 1994 
El Verbo church had grown to “an estimated 15,000 members in 25 congregations” across the country.18  
                                                
16 Arturo Arias, “Changing Indian Identity: Guatemala’s Violent Transition to Modernity.” In 
Guatemalan Indians and the state 1540 to 1988, edited by Carol A. Smith, 230-57 (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1994), 243. 
17 Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant?, 1-3, 189-190. 
18 Pew Research Center, “Historical Overview of Pentecostalism in Guatemala Origins and Growth,” 
October 5, 2006, http://www.pewforum.org/2006/10/05/historical-overview-of-pentecostalism-in-guatemala/ 
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 In retrospect, the 1976 earthquake was a decisive turning point in the religious 
transformation of Guatemala. But that turning point hinged on practical matters more than doctrinal 
ones. Arias also points out that “[n]ational and international news reports showed that the houses 
destroyed were those with the weakest construction, and that the poorest Guatemalans, the Indians, 
were the ones who suffered the highest losses.”19 Housing is one of the most basic infrastructures of 
any nation and such images highlighted the systematic high inequality of Guatemalan society, 
especially for the marginalized Mayan peoples. In addition, as the government recovered from the 
shock the earthquake, “the army tried to monopolize all international aid in order to funnel it through 
their own channels, reselling that aid for profit.”20 This is evidence of the corruption within the 
Guatemalan military, members of which filled their own pockets by taking advantage of their position. 
The earthquake thus exposed to the world the dysfunctionalism, racism, and corruption of the 
Guatemalan government. A few years later, Ríos Montt campaigned against corruption by trying to “openly 
equate Catholicism” with it.21 
In any case, much of the relief effort and reconstruction in Guatemala was mobilized by 
non-governmental actors. Shortly after the earthquake, Pentecostal churches and evangelical Christian 
groups in the U.S.,—such as the National Association of Evangelicals’ World Relief Commission, the 
Assemblies of God World Missions, and the Southern Baptist Foreign Mission Board—sent substantial 
                                                
19 Arturo Arias, “Changing Indian Identity: Guatemala’s Violent Transition to Modernity,” 243. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Pew Research Center, October 5, 2006. 
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aid as well as missionaries to the suffering people of Guatemala.22 As a result of the their efforts, 
“[e]vangelical growth increased from 8 percent a year before the catastrophe to 14 percent after it.”23  
This was not the first time contributions by Protestant churches in the U.S. was sent to Guatemala. But 
whereas “the first Protestant missionaries had arrived in Guatemala in 1882, only about 7 percent of the 
population belonged to a Protestant or evangelical church prior to the 1976 earthquake.”24 In addition, 
Garrard-Burnett suggests, although Protestant missionaries from mainline denominations such as the 
Presbyterian Church and Central American Mission had made great efforts to build hospitals, schools, 
and clinics in Guatemala for over a century, few Guatemalans converted to Protestantism before the 
mid-1960s.25 Regardless of a long-lasting devotion to support Guatemalan society, mainline Protestant 
churches failed to increase their membership in the country until the earthquake struck. As Swedish 
scholar Veronica Melander explains, “[t]he earthquake and the successive flow of foreign organizations 
and money were thus significant factors behind the opportunity for churches to expand their operations 
to more extensive areas of Guatemala, and to acquire more members for the churches.”26 This is an 
important fact because the earthquake marks how a natural disaster became a catalyst for American 
evangelical intervention in a foreign county. 
                                                
22 Turek, “To Support a ‘Brother in Christ,’” 692. 
23 Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant?, 12. 
24 Turek, “To Support a ‘Brother in Christ,’” 695. 
25 Garrard-Burnett, Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit, 132. 
26 Veronica Melander, The Hour of God?: People in Guatemala Confronting Political Evangelicalism 
and Counterinsurgency (1976-1990) (Uppsala, Sweden: Swedish Institute of Mission Research at 
Uppsala University, 1999), 74. 
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One week after the earthquake, an influential American evangelist toured the most 
devastated areas. That was Billy Graham. After World WarⅡ, Billy Graham, then a fundamentalist, 
“attracted enormous crowds to his revival. In the 1950s he became a celebrity, well known in 
Washington.”27 Graham espoused a theology of religious revival. It was one that had distinctly 
political overtones. One scholar describes it as “Revival of souls for the revival of the nation. His theory 
of political change was straightforward: saved souls lead to a saved nation.”28 Billy Graham connected 
individual salvation with national salvation. His words provided his audience “with a politics that 
emphasized personal morality and individual responsibility.”29 Such notions are commonly shared by 
evangelicals: social ills are attributed to a lack of individual morality and responsibility, not to politics. 
Such a belief was the cornerstone of Ríos Montt’s political philosophy. 
Mass destruction and miserable conditions so overwhelmed Billy Graham that he sent large 
shipments of food, medicine, and clothing. Invoking ideas of theodicy and providence, he also 
suggested that the disaster “could serve a greater purpose and turn out to be a blessing, as the ‘tears shed 
by Guatemalans may be the way to reconciliation with God.’”30 Graham recognized the earthquake as 
a potential catalyst for a mass conversion to evangelicalism.31 This recognition could be called 
“disaster evangelicalism,” a term adapted from Canadian journalist Naomi Kline’s The Shock Doctrine: 
                                                
27 Frances FitzGerald, The Evangelicals: The Struggle to Shape America (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2017), 5. 
28 Daniel Hummel, “Revivalist Nationalism since World WarⅡ: From “Wake up, America!” to 
“Make America Great Again!.” Religions 7, no.11 (2016): 1. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Turek,“To Support a ‘Brother in Christ,’” 693. 
31 Ibid. 
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The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (2007). Evangelists’ attitudes toward the disaster in Guatemala 
overlapped with the policy plans of global capitalists, who intended to reconstruct not only the 
infrastructure of a disaster-stricken country, but also the broader social systems of developing countries. 
Poverty-stricken areas suffering from confusion due to the aftermath of a natural disaster or political 
turmoil made natural targets for global capitalists and neoliberals.  
 American evangelists took advantage of the tragic situation in Guatemala. They pushed 
Guatemalans to convert to evangelicalism by insisting that the earthquake was a sort of “punishment” 
from God. This idea, that the earthquake represented “God’s punishment,” did have an appeal to some 
Guatemalans. A survey conducted shortly after the earthquake shows that nearly 80 percent 
Guatemalan families believed that the disaster was either a sign of God’s displeasure or a divine call for 
redemption.32 This belief resonated with evangelical ambition and contributed to the rapid growth of 
the Protestant church in Guatemala. It also coincides with the rise in violence during the Guatemalan Civil 
War, which was entering its sixteenth year. 
According to Turek, “regardless of denomination, evangelicals shared a belief that they must 
engage in missionary work or evangelism to ‘make disciples of all nations,’ as Jesus commanded in his 
Great Commission to the eleven disciples at Galilee.”33 Premillennialists, such as Billy Graham, 
believed that “‘Jesus Christ will return personally and visibly, in power and glory, to consummate his 
salvation and his judgment’ as described in the books of Mark, Matthew, Hebrews, Revelation, and 
                                                
32 Garrard-Burnett, Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit, 133. 
33 Turek, “To Support a ‘Brother in Christ,’” 693. 
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others.”34 They read these Scriptures as prophecy and as evidence that evangelism must precede the 
Second Coming.35 This interpretation was supported by Billy Graham’s International Congress on 
World Evangelization held in Lausanne, Switzerland in 1974, in which religious leaders gathered from 
150 countries. “Delegates affirmed the usual biblical imperatives. Underlying their disagreements with 
liberal Protestants, they radically expanded the definition of the need for missionary work.”36 Turek 
states: “Many Western evangelicals viewed global efforts to spread the Gospel as the most significant 
form of social action they could undertake as Christians.”37 Based on this religious belief, famous 
evangelists and major para-church organizations delivered assistance as well as missionaries to 
Guatemala, which rushed to the cities and countryside to help the country rebuild and to plant churches 
at every opportunity.38  
This rapid expansion of Protestantism, mostly Pentecostalism, changed the religious and 
political landscape of Guatemala. As David Stoll claims, Catholic bishops even went so far as to 
denounce an “‘invasion of the sects’ that they attributed to a political conspiracy coordinated by the U.S. 
                                                
34 Ibid., 694. Premillennialism, according to Frances FitzGerald, is “the contrary belief that civilization 
is becoming more wicked so that God will intervene and subject civilization to a thousand years of 
tribulations before He comes again with his army of saints and destroys Satan and the earth” 
(FitzGerald 639). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant?, 73. 
37 Turek, “To Support a ‘Brother in Christ,’”694. 
38 Ibid., 695. Parachurch organizations are “Christian, heavily evangelical Protestant, public charities 
focused on providing religious goods and services outside of any congregational or denominational 
sponsorship” (Scheitle, Dollhopf, and McCarthy, “Spiritual Districts: The Origins and Dynamics of 
US Cities with Unusually High Concentrations of Parachurch Organizations,” Social Science History 
41, no. 3 (2017), 505). 
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government.”39 These Catholic bishops may have recognized that evangelicals were deeply connected 
to political right in the U.S. As Garrard-Burnett points out, the percentage of Protestants constituted 
nearly a quarter of the overall population in 1980. The percentage was “much higher in rural areas, 
including the zone of conflict, where the repression of Catholics [by government] and overwhelming 
circumstances drove people to seek out new religious options.”40 This means, in part, that Catholic 
Churches did not respond effectively to the religious and social demands of Guatemalans, especially 
those Mayan peoples suffering from destruction, poverty, and violence after the earthquake and during 
the civil war. This helps to explain why so many people moved toward Pentecostalism.  
Also important to note is that the U.S. Pentecostal churches that delivered various kinds of 
aid to Guatemala were well funded. Their wealth attracted people to evangelical churches. Part of the 
church’s role, in the views of many of the rural poor, was not only to give spiritual consolation but also 
to provide material and social assistance, especially in a poverty-stricken country where government 
was ineffectual or unwilling to help them. Often, evangelical efforts were made on behalf of the poor in 
cities as well. This means that Pentecostal churches played a roll beyond religious expression alone. 
Protestantism became the basis for a new social network for the poor. 
After the earthquake, Pentecostal churches often provided food, temporally housing, and 
short-term loan programs to help newly arrived migrants from rural areas.41 These programs would not 
                                                
39 David Stoll, Between Two Armies in the Ixil Towns of Guatemala (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1993), 168. 
40 Garrard-Burnett, Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit, 133. 
41 Garrard-Burnett, Protestantism in Guatemala, 123. 
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have been sustainable without the rich funding and support services that Protestant-run associations 
such as women’s support groups, youth fellowships, and Alcoholics Anonymous. These groups 
provided “important supportive relationships, which helped newcomers to the city avoid the kinds of 
social ills most commonly associated with low-income urban migration.”42 Generally, poor families 
newly relocated to urban areas tend to be socially isolated, which can result in problems such as 
alcoholism, drug addiction, domestic violence, and child abuse. Protestant institutions sought to address 
these issues and to build closer relationships, by creating a sense of community. In this way, Pentecostal 
churches and associations greatly assisted people in rural areas as well as new migrants in the cities. 
Furthermore, “[w]ith [evangelical churches’] insistence on sobriety and the inculcation of the so-called 
Protestant work ethic [such as diligence, faithfulness, and patience], conversion to Pentecostalism often 
led to upward social mobility.”43 It is uncertain how much can be attributed to the Protestant work ethic 
but some members did improve their economic condition.  
In this way, Pentecostalism won the hearts and minds of people in both rural and urban areas 
by providing material and social support to them. As I will show, even though each Protestant sect has a 
different identity, “they share a ministry that promotes a direct, emotional relationship with God and a 
strong emphasis on individualism and self-improvement.”44 George Pixley, an American Professor of 
Bible at the Baptist Seminary in Mexico City, argues that there is a negative side to this: 
We believe that the deep problems in Latin American society can only be solved if people 
                                                
42 Ibid., 122-123. 
43 Turek, “To Support a ‘Brother in Christ,’” 697. 
44 Simons, The New York Times, November 7, 1982. 
 20 
organize and make structural changes. But the [Protestant] sects effectively undercut any 
political participation outside the church, like union activities. They demobilize people.45  
In over-emphasizing individual responsibility, in other words, evangelical theology can often hinder 
attempts at changing unfair social structures. This may in part explain how Ríos Montt’s dictatorship 
claimed to help the people without actually changing any of the government’s military policies, which 
repressed the poor people of the Guatemalan highlands. 
 Pentecostalism’s promise of economic salvation was fulfilled only through theological 
salvation. From a more explicitly religious perspective, theologian Nestor Medina argues that 
“Pentecostalism helped people rebuild their lives and make sense of their reality through apocalyptic 
lenses. The Pentecostal message of the imminent coming of the Lord, war, suffering, and earthquakes 
as signs of the end times contributed greatly to people flocking to Pentecostal churches.”46 In other 
words, “the eschatological message seemed to fit the social and political context” that characterized the 
Guatemalan Civil War.47  
The idea that eschatology and providence go together, that divine intervention can be 
detected in natural disasters, such as earthquakes, has a long and well-documented history. Voltaire’s 
Poeme sur le disastre de Lisbonne en 1755, ou examen de cet axiom: Tout est bien, is but one of the 
more famous and oft-studied critiques of this kind of thinking. Voltaire questioned the prevailing 
Enlightenment-era view that all things that come to pass, even pain, are in the end just, because they 
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seemingly are in accord with God’s will.48 Voltaire rejected this view, finding it not only dangerous but 
a hinderance to positive change. 
The eschatology that emerged after the Guatemalan earthquake was used to remove critical 
thinking toward social problems on the part of newly converted Protestant Guatemalan believers. This 
might have made them more obedient to the Protestant church and to government authority, by 
supporting suspicion of the critical analysis from academics and the free press on the immediate social 
and political upheaval happening in the country. 
Remarkably, Pentecostalism spoke to immediate social and economic realities while also 
providing a bridge to older indigenous beliefs. Pentecostalism revolves around “baptism in the Holy 
Spirit, as manifested by faith healing, speaking in tongues, prophecy, and other manifestations of the 
miraculous.”49 Its emphasis on “ecstatic expression and the experience of ‘unmediated personal 
relationship with God,’ drew immigrants in, yet it also blended syncretically with elements of 
indigenous spirituality that had persisted in rural villages.”50 Syncretism made the Mayan embrace of 
Pentecostalism in Guatemala possible. But there was a difference between the urban and rural areas. As 
Turek argues “[a]lthough Pentecostalism spread quickly and became indigenized among rural Mayans, 
Pentecostal churches in the cities tended to retain an American character and bonds with counterparts in 
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the United States, even as local leaders gradually took over from the original missionaries.”51 It may be 
that the rapid growth of evangelicalism in rural areas was due to the fact that Mayan peoples were 
brutally persecuted by the government. It may have been easier to evangelize Mayan peoples who had 
limited access to daily commodities, formal education, and spiritual consolation. 
Evangelical beliefs and institutions found their way into the Guatemalan education system as 
well. El Verbo and its mother church, the California-based Church of the Word, which is sponsored by 
the Gospel Outreach organization, played a significant role in spreading evangelical beliefs in society 
by incorporating its “principles” an education system, advocated by El Verbo, that competed with 
traditional public schools. Along these lines, El Verbo’s leader, Carlos Ramírez ordained Ríos Montt as 
“the ruler” to lead Guatemala during this time of crisis. Their “Principle Education,” embraced and 
embodied by Ríos Montt, was based on the seven principles: “individuality, stewardship, unity and 
union, Christian Character, self-control, sovereignty of God, and planting and harvesting.”52 Teachers 
of El Verbo sponsored schools attempted to integrate these principles into everything they taught. For 
example, in a lecture about Mayan culture, “while praising the Mayans for some of their 
accomplishments, [teacher] argues that they lost their lands because they were not good stewards.”53 
As sociologist Susan D. Rose and writer Steve Brouwer argue, “[Evangelicalism] indentifies social 
conflicts as individual problems, then provides individualistic solutions which discourage collective and 
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critical analysis at the structural level.”54 We can say that an education based on such evangelical 
principles deprives students of the ability to think critically. Accordingly, it produces “desirable” people 
for those in authority to govern.  
Because of a poorly funded public education system, evangelical education, which was 
better funded, took advantage of the earthquake’s aftermath to indoctrinate Guatemalans. Because of its 
emphasis on individual responsibility rather than social reform, evangelical beliefs was widely 
appealing to the Guatemalan ruling class. “The inequality and lack of opportunity created by the 
Guatemalan class structure provided fertile ground for evangelical schools to offer basic education.”55 
Most importantly, evangelical education’s emphasis on obedience to authority helped to turn eyes away 
from the civil war and the human rights violations against Mayan peoples in the Guatemalan highlands. 
As a result, by suppressing dissent it may have played a role in prolonging the civil war and 
contributing to the Mayan genocide. 
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Televangelists’ Influence on the U.S. Government’s “Culture Wars” 
Imported evangelicalism from the U.S. transformed the religious, social, and political 
landscape in Guatemala. Before it could do so, it first had to find a foothold in the United States. In this 
section, I explore the emergence of U.S. evangelicals in U.S. society and politics, which foreshadows 
some of the ways in which they became influential in Guatemala. It shows us how religious beliefs can 
be mobilized as powerful political forces during a time when communism was viewed as the ultimate 
enemy of the U.S. In this context, the guerrillas in many Central American nations, many of whom 
were associated with communism, were viewed as enemies of Christianity. This view helped to change 
the reform-minded evangelicals into conservative anti-communists. 
 According to Garrard-Burnett, during most of the twentieth century, much of U.S. Christian 
activism had been fueled by a reform-minded, tolerant, and liberal outlook, which was influenced by 
theologians such as Walter Rauschenbusch and Reinhold Niebuhr, as well as the Christian activism of 
Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.56 However, evangelicals and fundamentalists started to become 
increasingly concerned with secularism and the supposed moral decline of the 1960s. A professor at the 
University of West Georgia, Daniel K. Williams details their concerns: “[t]he sexual revolution, sex 
education, race riots, the counterculture, increases in drug use, and the beginning of the feminist 
movement convinced them that the nation had lost its Christian identity and that the family was under 
attack.”57 These “culture wars” led them “to unite with socially conservative allies, even if they 
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happened to be Catholic.”58 Culture wars paved the way that evangelical belief intervenes in national 
politics. 
The liberal, social justice strain of American Protestantism reached its peak with the election 
of Democrat Jimmy Carter to the presidency in 1976, but it was short-lived. Carter’s foreign policy	 
which centered on human rights was based on a highly ethical conception of Christian charity. Carter 
was a “born-again” Christian president and his administration directly and openly acknowledged the 
influence of the president’s moral judgments and Christian values in the making of both domestic and 
foreign policy decisions for the first time in modern history.59 Carter applied his liberal Protestant 
belief to policymaking. But Carter’s attempts did not bear fruit. “American conservatives labeled the 
morally estimable but politically maladroit Carter administration—a period marked by the worst energy 
crisis to date, severe economic recession, and the national humiliation of a hostage crisis in Iran—a 
debacle.”60 Carter’s ineffective presidency, along with his liberal Protestantism, fueled a growing 
distrust of party politics, especially among evangelicals and Christian fundamentalists who valued 
traditional American moral values “were interested mainly in restoring laissez faire capitalism and 
fighting communism.”61 As a result, the Carter administration inadvertently brought about the decline 
of liberal Christian belief, which allowed the Christian Right to intervene directly into U.S. politics at a 
time when liberal Protestantism should have been ascendant.  
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Influential televangelists were crucial in replacing liberal Protestantism with conservative 
Protestantism in the political arena. As Williams suggests, “evangelical leaders such as Jerry Falwell 
and Pat Robertson saw that conservative Christians had the prominence to dictate the term of alliance to 
Republican politicians and force the Republican Party to begin paying attention to evangelicals’ stances 
on abortion, gay rights, and the ERA [Equal Rights Amendment].”62 Falwell and Robertson regarded 
conservative Christians as powerful political actors who could win culture wars as well as religious 
wars by bringing their conservative Christian values from the pulpit to politics. In addition, there were 
several factors behind the expansion of evangelicalism: the growth of Christian colleges, an increase in 
the number of highly educated evangelicals, cultural products based on apocalyptic prediction, and 
evangelical television networks.63 The emergence of charismatic televangelists such as Jerry Falwell, 
Pat Robertson, and Jimmy Swaggart also played a significant role in propagating a politicized 
evangelical message as well as raising funds. 
Jerry Falwell was a Southern Baptist pastor and nationally known televangelist who 
broadcasted the weekly Old-Time Gospel Hour program from 373 stations across the country. He was 
also a leading figure in conservative evangelical circles, and his church was one of the largest in the U.S. 
In addition, he was a fund-raising genius who used direct mail and on-air appeals to collect more 
money each year than the Democratic National Committee.64 Regarding Falwell’s theological and 
political position, historian Daniel Hummel defines Jerry Falwell as somebody “who succeeded [Billy] 
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Graham as the unofficial spokesman for evangelicalism in the 1970s.”65 Jerry Falwell explained a new 
theory of revival and its relationship to politics in 1981: “to win divine blessing God cared less about 
individual souls and more about the principles that society was based upon. A nation may be full of 
unregenerate sinners[...], but if it upheld biblical principles it could remain God’s graces.”66 This idea 
clearly shows how Falwell thought government should be based solely on biblical principles, which 
would bring about individual salvation. This recognition was shared with Ríos Montt, as I will show in 
later sections. 
         Falwell constructed his own media as well as fund-raising system, which enabled him to 
spread his doctrine and to obtain abundant funds simultaneously. Falwell described himself as 
“aggressively fundamentalist.”67 He insisted that fundamentalism must be clearly distinguished from 
other conservative Christian movements for “its militant opposition to Liberalism.”68 His moral 
position was anti-pornography, anti-abortion, and anti-homosexuality, which resonated with New Right 
politicians who espoused similar moral values.  
Falwell launched moral campaigns to encourage his believers to boycott local stores that 
sold pornography, or to put anti-gay-rights initiatives on local ballots. Falwell was convinced that “a 
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city-by-city, grassroots campaign could turn back the tide of cultural liberalism in the United States.”69 
Initially, Falwell emphasized that his religious commitments amounted to moral campaigns; he was 
reluctant to call for direct political involvement. Eventually, though, he recognized that his local 
campaigns had only limited success in bringing the country back to his fundamentalist morality. He 
therefore launched the Moral Majority in June 1979. It was, as historian Frances FitzGerald has 
suggested, “an organization designed to register conservative Christians and mobilize them into a 
political force against what [Falwell] called ‘secular humanism’ and the moral decay of the country.”70 
As Falwell put it: “We are fighting a holy war […] this time we are going to win.”71 The Moral 
Majority was a political organization that represented the beginning of Falwell’s involvement in 
national politics. Furthermore, in September 1979, Falwell founded the Moral Majority PAC in order to 
raise funds for the campaigns of conservative Republican candidates. From this point forward, Falwell 
was “no longer merely a pastor; he was a professional lobbyist and political operative.”72 
 As a political operative, Falwell expanded the scope of his preaching. In the middle of 
the Cold War, Falwell was convinced “communism was an impediment to global evangelism and 
satanic conspiracy that had to stop.”73 In addition, communism was an affront to providence. Falwell 
believed strongly in American exceptionalism: “[t]he United States played a special role in the Lord’s 
plan for world history—not least by defending against communism—and if it was in decline, the 
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solution was to return to the God who had blessed America in former times.”74  
 The inefficient Carter regime, conservative theologians argued, endangered the 
traditional moral values of the U.S. As we will see, Ríos Montt utilized similar rhetoric when he came 
to power in Guatemala. Ríos Montt shared this anticommunist position and emphasized the same 
traditional values heralded by American evangelicals. He famously stated: the most important human 
relationship “does not come from Communism nor democracy but that is of the family, the sharing of 
everything, the working for the community.”75 Ríos Montt clearly rejected communism, but here he 
also seems to question Western democracy. Emphasizing the family as the core of all human attempts 
to improve the society, he tried to depoliticize his people. He did this by offering a religious narrative: 
“[a]s soon as you have peace in your heart, there will be peace in your house, and when there peace in 
your house, there will be peace in society.” Such beliefs, suggested by his church El Verbo, led to Ríos 
Montt’s authoritarianism by trivializing social problems, minimizing them as just individual or family 
affairs.76 
After Carter’s debacle, Falwell’s aggressive political attitude, which was based on his 
fundamentalist evangelical belief as well as his commitment to American exceptionalism, appealed to 
evangelicals. They strongly supported his politics and the politicians he endorsed.77 Fear that the nation was 
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losing its morality and national prestige, mobilized evangelicals to assert, what they believe is their entitlement, to 
decide what is best for the nation. 
Falwell mobilized his followers to vote for conservative Republican candidates. By the fall 
of 1980 Falwell claimed that “the Moral Majority had chapters in forty-seven states and had registered 
four million voters.78 However, Falwell’s “ability to mobilize a “moral majority” was more limited 
than he had expected.”79 Frances FitzGerald points out that “[the Moral Majority] failed to attract 
Catholics or even a spectrum of conservative Protestants.”80 Falwell never achieved his political 
ambitions, such as a coalition of Catholics, Jews, and Protestants, for example, or the acquisition of 
broader support from Baptists and other influential televangelists. In addition, “Falwell’s audience of 
1.5 million comprised only a small fraction of the 20 million Americans who regularly watched 
religious television, and even they were reluctant to join the Moral Majority.”81 It could be said that 
evangelicals supported Falwell’s political position in principle, but they nevertheless refused to join his 
organization in great numbers. Still, in a larger context, he achieved his purpose in the end. As Williams 
points out, “One survey showed that more than 20 percent of Moral Majority supporters who cast their 
ballots for Reagan in 1980 had voted for Carter in 1976. More importantly, Falwell gave the Christian 
Right a national voice that it would not otherwise have had.”82 Falwell was unable to raise the Moral 
Majority to the national level with a coalition of different denominations, but he still helped to win 
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votes for a new, powerful conservative Republican President—Ronald Reagan. The popular perception 
of the power of the evangelical Right was greater than its actual strength, perhaps, but few saw it that way at the 
time. 
By the summer of 1980, prominent evangelicals such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, 
who differed from each other theologically, united to form the Christian Right’s chief political 
coalition: the Religious Roundtable. This organization sought, as its founders claimed, “to take the 
nation back for the cause of Christ.”83 After failing to persuade Carter to change his stance on abortion 
and school prayer, members of the Religious Roundtable reached an agreement to support Ronald 
Reagan as a candidate for president.84 In the press conference, Reagan said that “‘all the complex 
questions facing us at home and abroad’ have their answers in the Bible.”85 This statement shows that 
Reagan supported the idea that both domestic and international political issues could find Biblical 
solutions. But this statement also reflects his political ambition. Reagan and the Religious Roundtable 
viewed each other as useful counterparts: Reagan needed evangelical votes in order to defeat Carter in 
the South, and evangelical leaders aspired to legislate controversial issues such as anti-abortion and 
school prayer. In Williams’ estimation, “[w]hile Reagan distanced himself from the Christian Right’s 
theology, he endorsed the movement’s attempt to bring religion into politics.”86 In a press conference, 
Reagan even went so far as to urge “the biblical story of creation be taught in the public schools as an 
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alternative to evolution.”87 On the other hand, evangelical preachers timed their remarks to produce the 
greatest possible benefit for the Republican Party.88 These evangelical efforts helped to bring about 
Reagan’s landslide victory, which in their opinion represented a victory for evangelicals as well.  
It is often suggested that the direct cause of Reagan’s triumph in the 1980 election was the 
ineffectiveness of the Carter administration. Whatever the reason, the remarkable fact is that the 
presidential campaign of 1980 marked a turning point in U.S. political history. This presidential 
election represents the point when “fundamentalists and evangelicals would be united in supporting 
Republican presidential candidates; no Democrat since has won a majority of white evangelicals and 
fundamentalists support in presidential candidates.”89 1980 was the year that the Christian Right 
appeared on the stage of national politics for the first time as a force to be reckoned with. 
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From Counterculture to Fundamentalism: The Transformation of the Jesus Movement 
This is the political and theological background out of which Gospel Outreach—the sponsor 
of Ríos Montt’s church El Verbo—emerged. El Verbo is one of more than 45 congregations in seven 
countries affiliated with Gospel Outreach, an evangelical Pentecostal church with its headquarters 270 
miles northwest of San Francisco.90 Gospel Outreach grew out of the Jesus Movement that swept the 
U.S. in the late 1960s and the early 1970s.91 The Jesus Movement resonated with freedom-worshiping 
counterculture Americans, including the Beat Generation and, later, the hippie movement, which faded 
away by the mid-1970s. According to reporting by The New York Times, Gospel Outreach represents:  
dozens, possibly hundreds, of small sects that were set up by members of counterculture 
movement of the 1960’s, many of whom dropped out of conventional society, experimented 
with drugs, traveled, and in some cases gravitated to what became known as the Jesus 
movement.92 
An instructor at Wheaton College, Larry Eskridge adds further information about the countercultural 
scene out of which Gospel Outreach grew: 
[the] counterculture had its origins in the antiestablishment, hedonistic attitudes of the ’50s 
Beat movement. Fed up with what they perceived as the sterile conformity and consumerism 
of postwar middle-class life, a sizable number of American youth began to drop out of the 
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rat race of school and career to seek fulfillment through personal and communal 
relationships, drugs, sex, music, and esoteric spirituality.93 
According to this account, the counterculture movement represented a cultural and social revolution 
challenging the social and political establishment. This was very far from the conservative values of the 
evangelicals who came to prominence during the 1980 election. 
The Jesus Movement was an evangelical Christian strain of the counterculture, which 
blossomed in San Francisco’s Haight-Ashbury district during the famed Summer of Love in 1967. But 
the Jesus Movement grew rapidly beyond the West Coast. Eskridge states that “similar manifestations 
of a hippieized Christianity popped up in the next two years—in Oregon, Seattle, Spokane, Fort 
Lauderdale, Detroit, Milwaukee, upstate New York.”94 Very quickly, the Jesus Movement could be 
found “anywhere that the counterculture and evangelical Christianity might rub shoulders.”95 The 
youths who joined the Jesus Movement were called Jesus People. According to historian Preston Shires, 
Jesus People thought, “Jesus was human, he was God, he was living love itself; and so, he was the 
perfect friend and true guide for a complete, authentic, and fulfilling life.”96 This description indicates 
that Jesus People sympathized with Jesus as a human who had struggled with all too human difficulties. 
This perspective toward Jesus was fresh and appealed to rebellious youths who sought spiritual 
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fulfillment in a new, more personal mode of religious expression.  
The counterculture and the new evangelical movements had a good deal in common. Shires 
claims that promoters of street evangelism (usually local church pastors) and street evangelists (usually 
parachurch ministries) who spread biblical grounded Christianity to counterculture youths “performed a 
function in the development of countercultural Christianity that was similar to the Beat’s contribution to 
the development of the counterculture in general.”97 But what was street evangelism, exactly? As 
Shires puts it, street evangelism was “evangelization that took place outside of the regular churched 
context and in places frequented by youth. In its largest sense, then, the street might also refer to a 
campus setting as well.”98 Evangelicals recognized that there was a spiritual and religious gap between 
rebellious youths and older generations, so they attempted to attract youths by creating a new type of 
Christianity. Shires describes how these street evangelists developed a countercultural Christianity in 
order to be accepted by rebellious youths:  
By dressing casually, by confronting fellow youth one-on-one with a seemingly new 
spiritual message, by distributing tracts and newspapers presenting Jesus in popular style, by 
using the coffeehouse setting, with its rock’ n’ roll music and standup sensational testimonies, 
street evangelists created a new type of biblically focused religion that is best described as 
countercultural Christianity.99 
Street evangelists transformed Christianity by adopting the elements of youth culture, which 
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successfully attracted counterculture youths. But as Shires also points out, just as Allen Ginsberg had a 
link with an older generation outsiders or leftists, the pioneers of street evangelism also fostered a 
connection with older evangelical representatives. “They were the bridge,” he writes, “over which 
evangelicalism and countercultural Christianity could be joined.”100 Street evangelists’ connections 
with older evangelical outsiders helped fill the religious gap between countercultural Christians and 
older evangelicals.  
Street evangelists utilized various channels, such as coffeehouses and college campuses, in 
order to convey the gospel to young people. Among these channels, coffeehouses set up by street 
evangelists played a unique and important role in the Jesus Movement. Eskridge argues that “the 
biggest factor in the Jesus movement’s move into the mainstream of American youth culture during the 
early and mid-1970s was the widespread adoption of the coffeehouse as a focal point for meetings, 
Bible studies, concerts, and evangelistic activity.”101 The Christian use of coffeehouses as meeting 
places connected counterculture youth with evangelists. These were places where the concerns and 
troubles of young people could be addressed in an atmosphere that was “warm, friendly, understanding, 
joyful, loving, constructive, refreshing, spiritual, beautiful.”102 The coffeehouse became an alternative 
home that allowed youths to confess their concerns and feelings with ease. 
        At the time, there are several sects of evangelicals. Shires indicates that the street evangelists 
had a variety of denominational backgrounds: “fundamentalist, Pentecostal, new evangelical, and 
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Charismatic.”103 Whatever their background, though, “the street evangelists and their converts tended 
to develop a unified countercultural Christian message shorn of denominationalism that greater 
evangelicalism would ultimately have to come to terms with.”104 This suggests that introducing 
counterculture youths to biblically grounded Christianity was prioritized more than emphasizing the 
differences between denominations. In other words, the evangelizing cause was not divided by doctrine. 
Gospel Outreach, under James Durkin’s direction, was a typical example of the how these evangelical 
churches developed: 
the basic precepts of the church evolved: unquestioned acceptance of the Bible as the literal 
word of God; a missionary responsibility to reach out and carry the word to others; a 
decentralized with autonomous congregations and little distinction between clergy and laity; 
strong emphasis on family ties, and a Pentecostal liturgy similar to that of the Assembly of 
God, which includes the practice of speaking in tongues.105  
The most remarkable point here is that these church systems were simple and not so rigid, easily 
allowing new members to join. At the same time, the churches strongly encouraged members to engage 
in missionary work. These factors contributed to a swift increase in membership.  
  It is worth examining the strategies of some prominent representatives of the Jesus 
Movement to show how they succeeded in increasing their membership during this time. Chuck Smith 
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was “one of the first ministers to successfully bring hippies into a church.”106 He had been raised a 
Pentecostal and was educated at Aimee Semple McPherson’s Lighthouse for International Foursquare 
Evangelism, where he was ordained in her International Church of the Foursquare Gospel.107 However, 
he left McPherson’s organization because “he had tired of denominational politics and bureaucracy.”108 
Smith took on the pastorship of Calvary Chapel in Costa Mesa in 1965, which was “the largest single 
embodiment of the developing Jesus movement in Southern California.”109 Smith was “willing to 
adapt his church to the needs of people awash in pop culture. To expand the youth ministry, he even 
ventured to hire one of the beach hippies.”110 That hippie was Lonnie Frisbee.  
 According to Eskridge, Frisbee was an ardent Christian with an unmistakable flower-child 
appearance. Smith was impressed by Frisbee’s “love of Jesus and Spirit-filled personality” and asked 
him to preach at Huntington Beach and other local hippie hangouts.111 Within two years, young people 
rushed to Calvary Chapel and the ministry there baptized some fifteen thousand converts in the nearby 
Pacific Ocean.112 The influx of youth influenced the church’s worship style. Rock music was used, 
which “broke the establishment’s hymnal mode and allowed young people to convey contemporary 
messages.”113 Rock music became a new evangelical mode of expression, which mixed emotion and 
faith for young people. Shires explains the reason why Calvary Chapel in Costa Mesa attracted youths 
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so successfully: “[i]mportant to the evangelical-countercultural nexus was Smith’s personable, 
unaffected, and simple approach to ministry and pulpit, which young people accepted as proper pastoral 
behavior.”114 Shires also suggests that Calvary Chapel churches’ laid-back and warm-hearted worship 
style captured large numbers of baby boomers.115 Churches changed their style of worship in order to 
attract youth membership by tapping onto young people’s search for the new expressions as well as 
human connections in their spiritual quests.  
Another successful evangelist was John Wimber, who was one of Smith’s early associates as 
well as a former rock musician. Wimber began a church, Calvary Chapel of Yorba Linda, California in 
1977. Wimber’s ministry “emphasized the gifts of the spirit, speaking in tongues and healing and it also 
produced contemporary worship songs that emphasized the person-to-person relationship between God 
and believer.”116 Wimber’s church kept growing, and eventually he left Calvary Chapel group and 
joined Vineyard churches in 1982. Shires indicates the reason why Wimber’s church was successful: 
“Wimber had removed the ritualistic constraints found in traditional church services and turned worship 
time into something resembling a casual and pleasant ‘happening.’”117 Wimber lowered the bar of 
what constituted church activities as well as introduced the element of entertainment into worship. 
These elements had a lot in common with Smith’s church and were compelling not only for 
counterculture youths but also for older evangelical generation.118 Actually, according to Eskridge, by 
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the end of the twentieth century, Calvary Chapel and its offspring Vineyard churches became major 
forces within American evangelicalism even after the Jesus Movement faded away during the mid and 
late 1970s.119  
In 1972, Campus Crusade’s Explo’72 was held in Dallas, Texas.120 Over eighty thousand 
young people came from across the nation “to worship, sing, and hone their skills in evangelism.”121  
The vast majority of participants were “between the age of 15 and 30.”122 Shires insists “nothing was 
more indicative of this confluence of countercultural and evangelical experience than the success of 
Campus Crusade’s Explo’72.”123 Explo’72 was the most symbolic event of the merger of the 
counterculture and evangelicalism. However, Shires also argues that in order for countercultural 
Christianity and evangelicalism to merge at the national level, “there needed be national evangelical 
spokesmen with powerful influence who would turn a kind eye toward the radical religious youth 
movement.”124 Influential evangelicals such as “Carl Henry, Francis Schaeffer, Billy Graham, and Pat 
Robertson helped make the new expression of Christianity more understandable and even acceptable to 
the larger body of evangelicals.”125 In addition, in speaking to Pope Paul VI, Ronald Reagan especially 
praised the Jesus Movement. He thought it demonstrated “how so many young people had simply 
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turned from drugs to faith in Jesus.”126 It was at this point that the Jesus Movement became a national, 
political force. Its influence on the president was undeniable, and this, more than the actual number of Jesus 
People, gave evangelical leaders political currency that resonated with many conservative politicians. 
Among these nationally famous evangelicals, Francis Schaeffer was a representative 
Christian thinker who bridged counterculture Christians and the Christian Right. Schaeffer connected 
with “middle-class youth, even rebellious youth, in a way that few biblically grounded leaders did.”127  
Schaeffer relied on “national revival as the primary frame which promote mass political action in the 
1980s.”128 In 1955 Schaeffer and his wife Edith founded an evangelical community named L’Abri (the 
shelter) in Switzerland. The Schaeffers welcomed anyone, including university students, indigent 
travelers, unwed mothers, homosexuals, interracial couples, atheists, and Jesus freaks. They offered 
hiking, hearty meals, Sunday church services, informal seminars, and so forth.129 Later, Schaeffer’s son 
Frank described his father as a “hip guru preaching Jesus to hippies.”130 L’Abri became a destination 
for “young leftwing iconoclasts who wanted to ‘buck the evangelical establishment,’ as Schaeffer urged 
them to do.”131 Schaeffer shared an anti-establishment attitude with the Left, was a friend of minorities, 
but was always suspicious of government intrusion into the daily lives of people. He was especially doubtful of 
the Democratic Party’s penchant for supporting liberal causes with little or no justification in biblical doctrine. 
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By the late 1960s, Schaeffer had become “an internationally known Christian thinker and 
celebrated lecturer at American evangelical colleges. He sold 3 million copies of his twenty-four books 
in the United States alone, and his works were translated into twenty-one languages.”132 As previously 
mentioned, the U.S. underwent culture wars over sex education, gay rights, abortion, drug use and so 
on in the 1960s and the 1970s. Schaeffer showed empathy for counterculture hippies and criticized 
Christian’s conservativeness. At the same time, Schaeffer attacked liberals, too. He criticized “liberal 
spirituality for being inauthentic, a sham, for parading about in spiritual garb while being technocratic at 
heart.”133 Schaeffer further insisted that “liberals curtailed liberties, especially the religious freedom of 
biblically grounded Christians.”134 His greatest concern was that U.S. society had abandoned Christian 
values and that its politics was led by “secular humanism.” Ríos Montt, as we will see, shared this 
concern. He insisted that creating a better Guatemala requires a belief in a Christian God. On April 18, 
1982, Ríos Montt said in his sermon on television: “you and I must have a reunion, we must have a 
reconciliation, we must feed the roots, the roots of a greater Guatemala which only happens when you 
renounce your interests and I renounce my pride, but it is achieved when you believe in God.”135 This 
statement suggests that Ríos Montt thought that Guatemalan society had fallen away from God’s 
discipline. Ríos Montt thought society should be based only and absolutely on God’s principles. 
                                                
132 Ibid. 
133 Shires, Hippies of the Religious Right, 159. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ríos Montt, original text taken from “Tenemos que limpiar la casa,” April 18, 1982. Mensajes del 
presidente de la República, General José Efraín Ríos Montt. (Guatemala: Tipografía National. 
1982). English translations by William Collazo. 
 43 
Individuals had to obey God’s rules by sacrificing their personal interests, otherwise, Guatemala would 
become a Godless society, ruled by arbitrary secular humanism.  
According to Williams, the experience of living in a highly secularized European academic 
community convinced Schaeffer that modern philosophies such as existentialism and structuralism 
were “egregiously wrong.” Moreover, Schaeffer concluded that “a Christian’s basic intellectual 
assumptions differed radically from those of contemporary society and that Christians now lived as 
aliens in a world that no longer accepted biblical truth.”136 In the turmoil of culture wars, secular humanism 
became a symbolic term used by Schaeffer and his adherents such as Falwell to attack movements and political 
decisions that, they argue, divided public opinion, such as gay rights, feminism, and the legalization of abortion, 
which were all supported by liberalism. Intentional, or not, many evangelicals directly connected Schaeffer's 
criticisms to pertain to the perceived moral erosion of the social fabric of the nation. This mobilized evangelicals 
to participate in national politics in an attempt to recover Christian moral values. 
Among several controversial issues, Schaeffer focused intently on was abortion. Williams 
argues that Schaeffer was “largely responsible for mobilizing evangelicals against abortion during the 
Carter Presidency.”137 With reference to abortion, Schaeffer argued that “Westerners, including 
Americans, had replaced God’s moral standards with ‘secular humanism,’ which allowed people to 
make their own capricious moral rules or live by none at all.”138 To Schaeffer, approval of abortion 
meant that arbitrariness could be applied to the judgment of life and death. Schaeffer interpreted the rise 
                                                
136 Williams, God’s Own Party, 139. 
137 Ibid., 154. 
138 Ibid., 139-140. 
 44 
of abortion rights and the looming threat of legal euthanasia “as products of a ‘culture of death’ rooted 
in humanism.”139 Schaeffer argued that politics should be conducted on the basis of absolute standards 
of truth, by which he meant Christian values, not arbitrary standards based on humanism.  
Schaeffer produced books and films to convey this message, and he urged evangelicals to 
take political action. In 1979, Schaeffer and Presbyterian elder C. Everett Koop released a documentary 
film entitled Whatever Happened to the Human Race? It describes the procedures of abortion and 
euthanasia in graphic detail. According to Williams, this film toured twenty American cities, but 
Schaeffer was disappointed at the audience response. Many did not share his strong anti-abortion 
position. Some church pastors hesitated to participate in a pro-life movement because it was highly 
controversial and seen predominantly as a Catholic issue. Still, some evangelicals who watched the film 
were often deeply moved, including Randall Terry, who later founded the militant antiabortion 
organization Operation Rescue.140  
Schaeffer’s works influenced Jerry Falwell, who started a pro-life campaign in 1978 with a 
nationally televised sermon, a book, and a fund-raising letter that focused on abortion after he had read 
Schaeffer’s articles about the issue. Falwell described Schaeffer as “‘one of the greatest men of my 
generation’ and a ‘man of courage.’”141 Schaeffer died in 1984, but ever since “many Christian right 
leaders have testified to the profound influence he had on their thinking.”142  
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In the early 1970’s, Schaeffer refused to work together with any particular political party. 
Ultimately, though, he came to support the Republican Party.143 Shires provides two reasons for this: 
first, “Schaeffer found more receptive ears in the Republican camp.”144 For example, Schaeffer 
became friends with Representative Jack Kemp, a Catholic, pro-life, conservative Republican, and the 
future presidential hopeful, at the Press Club dinner in Washington D.C. in 1971. Kemp arranged for 
Schaeffer to speak to gatherings of conservative congressmen and senators and began Bible studies 
based on Schaeffer’s writing.145 Kemp organized opportunities for Schaeffer to convey his faith to 
Republican politicians in person. Even if they did not share Schaeffer’s evangelical convictions, 
“certain conservatives were willing to accommodate their world view to that of the Schaeffers.”146 In 
this manner, Schaeffer became a conduit between conservative politics and evangelicalism. 
 Second, Schaeffer kept away from the Democratic Party because “he came to believe that 
committed and radical secular humanists, the diehard enemies of biblically grounded Christianity, had 
greater control over it.”147 During the late 1960s and early 1970s, organizations with anti-evangelical 
tones such as the National Organization for Women emerged and were openly supported by the 
Democratic Party leadership. Moreover, the Democrats believed in the legacy of Lyndon Johnson’s 
Great Society. For Schaeffer, this meant that “the Democrats were accommodationists with 
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technocracy.”148 For Schaeffer, this was an unpardonable offense. Schaeffer’s attitude toward the 
Democrats effectively placed them outside of evangelicalism’s worldview. Yet his attitude toward Republicans, 
on the other hand, placed them firmly on the inside. For many evangelicals, this was a clear endorsement of one 
political party over the other. This was a departure from previous behavior of evangelical leaders, who would 
focus on specific political issues only. In effect, Schaeffer is the author of the ideology that moved the entire 
evangelical cause into the Republican camp, where it has remained to this day. 
A test of this new alignment came with president Carter’s position regarding abortion. Carter 
personally opposed it, but “he was committed to upholding national law and the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Roe v. Wade. He opposed an antiabortion constitutional amendment, as did 55 percent of 
Americans in 1977.” 149  During Carter’s presidency, evangelicals’ pro-life movement became 
increasingly active in response. Pro-life activists were “jubilant when Representative Henry Hyde 
(R-IL), a Catholic, gave them their first legislative victory by blocking federal funding of abortion.”150 
On the other hand, the White House “did little after 1977 to retain the support of abortion rights 
opponents […] the differences between the two camps could no longer be ignored.”151 Moreover, 
Carter began promoting the ERA and endorsing the feminist movement. Even though Carter was 
welcomed by evangelicals as the first born-again president, whom they expected to carry out a 
Christian agenda, they came to conclude that Carter did not stand on their side in the culture wars. This 
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was a great disappointment to evangelicals, but it was also a catalyst in their political mobilization. 
They began looking for a new president who would reflect Christian moral values in national politics. 
In this context, the early connections that Schaeffer pioneered through Kemp and the Republican Party paid 
dividends. 
Data compiled in 2004 tells us something about the political trajectories of these new 
evangelicals. A survey was conducted of those who considered themselves a part of the Jesus 
Movement in the 1960s and 1970s. Asked about their “political identity prior to involvement with Jesus 
Movement,” 42% of total participants answered liberal, 27.2% moderate, 22.4% conservative, and 
8.4% had no answer. Asked about their “political identity today,” 10.3% answered liberal, moderate 
25.2%, conservative 57%, and 7.5% did not reply.152 This survey is evidence that the Jesus Movement 
successfully turned liberal-leaning counterculture youths into more politically conservative adults. 
As a result, we might say that the culture wars led conservative Protestantism to triumph in 
the form of President Ronald Reagan, who opposed communism and supported evangelical moral 
concerns, such as, opposing abortion. As Shires argues, “Francis Schaeffer had correctly perceived the 
importance of the abortion issue for galvanizing biblically grounded Christianity. Indeed, the abortion 
issue replaced communism as the jumping off point for evangelical political activism in the late 
1970s.”153 The issue of abortion became the catalyst for mobilizing evangelicals to support the Reagan 
administration. Evangelical leaders where overjoyed when Ronald Reagan won the election. However, 
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within a year of his first inauguration, they came to be disappointed because,  
Despite the high profile of leading Christian Right appointees, the Reagan administration 
remained committed to the moralists’ domestic agenda in rhetoric only. Only the foreign 
policy front […], Reagan’s promises to fight Godless Communism were fulfilled many 
times over. But the administration made no serious efforts to outlaw abortion or reinstate 
school prayer.154  
 “Let’s Make America Great Again” was Reagan’s slogan, which was meant to demonstrate the 
greatness of the United States to the world in the Cold War era. Reagan might have taken advantage of 
the abortion issue to get more evangelicals’ votes to win the Presidential election, but, as president, he 
did not focus on morality as much as on the economy and foreign policy. As Stoll has argued: 
In contrast to Carter’s talk about the need for humility, Reagan emphasized America’s power 
and greatness. In contrast to Carter’s attempts to promote human rights and negotiate peace 
in the Middle East, Reagan campaigned for new weapons systems and promoted wars.155 
It is clear that Reagan’s militant position toward communism was meant to show off the international 
presence of the United States. On Labor Day, 1980, just before the election, Reagan said: 
This country needs a new administration, with a renewed dedication to the dream of 
America—an administration that will give that dream new life and make America great 
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again. A growing economy and American exceptionalism.156  
In this way, Ronald Reagan prioritized economic issues and an anticommunist foreign policy based on 
American exceptionalism, all within a Christian set of values. In an instance of foreshadowing, 
Garrard-Burnett states, “[t]he inauguration of Ronald Reagan to the U.S. presidency in 1980 brought 
Central America to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy in a way that no region of Latin America had 
been since the early days of the Cuban Revolution.”157 Although Francis Schaffer was influential in 
ensuring that abortion became the most polarizing political issue for evangelicals, President Reagan 
was successful in attracting mobilized evangelicals to support his militant foreign policy in Central 
America, mostly by demonizing atheist communists as the enemy of Christianity. It can be said that 
Reagan was already predisposed to support Central American dictators like Ríos Montt. And it seems 
logical that Ríos Montt would ape Reagan’s approach to politics and demonize communist guerrillas in 
the same way, especially because Ríos Montt was a born-again evangelical who agreed with the 
prevailing evangelical logic uniting figures as different from each other as Reagan and Schaeffer.  
Ríos Montt saw himself, first and foremost, as a Christian leader: “I am only a 
Christian—and a Christian is a honorable man of character who has respect for others and who carries 
out the Word of God. It is true I govern with Biblical principles. But Christian principles are also good 
legal principles.”158 For Ríos Montt, political decisions were to be based on Christian principles, not on 
legalism or humanism, as he tried to apply Schaeffer’s logic to Guatemala’s situation in 1982. Ríos 
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Montt shared Schaeffer’s belief that evangelical principles should be incorporated into national politics. 
Nicaragua’s leftist Sandinistas had taken power in July 1979, overthrowing the dictatorship 
of long-standing U.S. ally Anastasio Somoza. Subsequently El Salvador’s Marxist guerrillas, the Frente 
Farabundo Marti Liberacion Naciocal (FMLN) launched their “’final offensive’ to take the capital city 
of San Salvador in January 1980.”159 The rapid expansion of communism in Central America—a 
“backyard” for U.S.—enhanced the sense of danger of Americans. “The timing and convergence of 
these events—pending military triumph of the Far Left in Central America and the election of an 
ardently anticommunist president in the North—meant that the region would end up serving as the 
proxy venue for a final showdown of the Cold War.”160 Guatemala became the proxy venue of the 
Cold War too, but it was virtually a “hot war” that got less attention from international community than 
Nicaragua and El Salvador. 
Ríos Montt understood that his most powerful supporters in the U.S. were evangelicals. 
Because evangelicals strongly supported president Reagan, evangelicals served as Ríos Montt’s 
connection to the Reagan administration’s foreign policy. President Reagan and Ríos Montt 
were bound to each other by a shared evangelical language, which provided support for the Guatemalan 
Civil War.  
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Evangelical Dictatorship: Ríos Montt, the “Savior of La Nueva Guatemala” 
On March 23, 1982, a coup d'état was carried out by young military officers at the National 
Palace in Guatemala City to depose Romero Lucas García. The officers announced that they would put 
a military junta at the head of government, which was led by a retired general of the army headquarters, 
Efraín Ríos Montt, along with two other generals. Ríos Montt was asked to become the new figurehead 
president “with the permission of his young North American shepherds.”161 He accepted the offer. “‘I 
am trusting my Lord and my King, that He shall guide me,’ [Ríos Montt] declared at a press conference 
the night of the coup, ‘because only He gives and takes away authority.’”162 This statement invokes 
Ríos Montt’s evangelical authority as a dictator.  
This section explores Ríos Montt’s dictatorship from March 1982 to August 1983. It focuses 
on how he incorporated evangelical principles into Guatemalan politics. By doing so, I hope to show 
how Ríos Montt’s “La Nueva Guatemala (the New Guatemala),” which was both “a political military 
project and a program for national redemption,” intensified terror, violence, and murder, especially 
against Mayan peoples in Guatemala.163 According to Garrard-Burnett, as a born-again Christian, Ríos 
Montt “wanted nothing less than for the nation of Guatemala to be born again as well: from this 
emerged the project that Ríos Montt called La Nueva Guatemala.”164 Ríos Montt attempted to 
reconstruct Guatemala based on an evangelical faith that took advantage of long-lasting political 
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turmoil. 
From the beginning of his presidency, Ríos Montt’s philosophy was clear. Fellow 
Pentecostal Jorge Serrano Elías properly described Ríos Montt in the following way: “[f]irst, he is a 
military man. Second, he is a moral fighter.”165 Ríos Montt had two missions: “a return to security and 
the defeat of the guerrillas, but at the same time, the government, so long associated with repression and 
corruption, had to reestablish its own legitimacy.”166 Ríos Montt attempted to complete these missions 
based on a trinity of essential principles, which dovetailed with the rhetoric of evangelical right that 
became influential in the United States: “morality, order and discipline, and national unity.”167 President 
Reagan used similar. On March 8, 1983, at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals 
held in Orlando, Florida, president Reagan stated; “I urge you to speak out against those who would place the 
United States in a position of military and moral inferiority.”168 Reagan was calling evangelicals to support his 
foreign policy: “The real crisis we face today is a spiritual one; at root, it is a test of moral will and faith...[and] I 
believe that communism is another sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages even now are being 
written.”169 Reagan interpreted the rapid expansion of communism in Central America as a spiritual crisis, 
which reinforced Ríos Montt’s understanding of anti-communism as moral issue. Both leaders were confident 
that communism could be defeated, and many evangelicals believed them. 
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On March 23, 1982, the day of the coup, Ríos Montt announced that he was “trying to revive 
values,” which was why he had “made a military move.”170 Ríos Montt suggested that through the use 
of the military force he was trying to revive Guatemala’s lost values. In effect, Ríos Montt assumed 
power in the name of morality. This was dangerous, because for him solutions for social problems 
necessitated the use of the army: “social solutions, the big social problems that confront us” requires a 
military man to take power and lead the way.171 Ríos Montt believed himself to be a moral man, one 
who merely utilized military means in search of moral solutions. He wanted to create a new order in 
Guatemalan society. Ruling the nation was like building a house, and Ríos Montt thought of himself as 
the chief architect, working towards a “roof made of morality.”172 
In another statement, from April 25, 1982, Ríos Montt again identified himself as the savior 
of Guatemala:   
Communism is clearly [...] working as an ideology, and that ideology is working to break 
values and it is saying: “Look at the one sent by God, Ríos, and he is now a pastor and all the 
problems he makes, he is the one breaking the values,” they say this without knowing God, 
and it is by the grace of that marvelous God which is precisely how I am talking with all of 
you.173  
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Here Ríos Montt has identified communism as godless, and himself as a man of God. It is interesting to 
note that Ríos Montt did not identify himself as a general or even as the president. This created a 
connection between Ríos Montt and God that communist rebels cannot break or challenge. This is 
similar to the feudal system of monarchs, who connected their authority directly to God, not to a 
constitution or any earthly authority, such as the people. This way of thinking turned Ríos Montt into 
the embodiment of God’s authority, the representative of proper morality and values. Ríos Montt’s 
religious identity had him next to God, thus creating a twentieth century religious-political dictator.  
One would think that the CIA or someone else in the US government would be suspicious of 
this kind of rhetoric from a Central American dictator, but because Ríos Montt was a Christian 
evangelical, such language was not only tolerated but accepted. Clearly, La Nueva Guatemala would 
not be a republic based upon the rule of law or the people. It would not be a democracy, but rather, a 
theocracy. To be specific, it was a Central American theocratic dictatorship, but because it was a 
Christian evangelical theocracy it was not seen as threatening by U.S. government.  
The confidence Ríos Montt demonstrated at the beginning of his presidency appealed to 
Guatemalans who were fed up with rampant violence and governmental corruption. On June 5, 1982, 
he expelled the other generals and became sole president of Guatemala. The army aimed to establish a 
clearer and more stable leadership for Guatemala by replacing the president.174 Ríos Montt’s ascension 
to power was celebrated by the U.S. Christian Right “as a sign of divine intervention in Central 
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America.”175 Pat Robertson also blessed the first evangelical president of Guatemala: 
In a country that had been noted for corruption, oppression, and violence, there was now joy 
and hope […] I found him to be a man of humility, simplicity, impeccable personal integrity, 
and a deep faith in Jesus Christ. I knew in my heart that Ríos Montt offered the people of all 
Latin America—a true alternative between the oppression of corrupt oligarchies and the 
tyranny of Russian-backed communist totalitarianism.176 
This statement is full of half-truths. It is true that Guatemala had been suffering from corruption, 
oppression, and political violence since the colonial era. But Ríos Montt had his own brand of 
oppression and corruption. Ríos Montt could not bring joy or hope, nor could he be a “true alternative.” 
On the contrary, he spread terror and distrust throughout the country. He bears responsibility for human 
rights violations against Guatemala’s poor, specifically its Mayan peoples. It is estimated that 86,000 
Mayan peoples were killed during Ríos Montt’s regime.177 Despite Robertson’s compliment, the name 
of Ríos Montt would be engraved in history for its connection to so many atrocities in modern Latin 
America. Nevertheless, Robertson’s enthusiasm says something essential about what Ríos Montt’s 
tenure represented in terms of evangelical political theology. What Robertson’s enthusiasm conveys is the 
overlap between evangelical and CIA worldviews: both brushed aside the humanitarian cost of backing dictators 
so long as they agreed to fight the moral and political threat of communism. 
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Ríos Montt’s origins may help to explain how he came to embrace the right tone, which endeared 
him to American evangelical leaders.	 Efraín Ríos Montt was born into a middle-class family in 
Huehuetenango on June 16, 1926. He became the eldest son among twelve siblings after his older 
brother died. His father was a shopkeeper and his mother was a homemaker who was the descendent of 
French immigrants to Guatemala. The family was not wealthy, but was highly respected in 
Huehuetenango nonetheless.178 Ríos Montt’s mother was Roman Catholic, but his grandmother was an 
evangelical, and she was “the only member of the family who could have been described as religiously 
zealous.”179  
Ríos Montt joined the army at age sixteen. After he graduated from the Escuela Politecnica 
at age twenty-three, then entered the U.S.-run institute known as the School of the Americas (SOA). 
According to the website of SOA Watch, an independent organization that seeks to close the SOA, the 
SOA is: 
 a combat training school for Latin American soldiers, located at Fort Benning, Georgia. 
Since 1946, the SOA has trained over 64,000 Latin American soldiers in counterinsurgency 
techniques, sniper training, commando and psychological warfare, military intelligence and 
interrogation tactics. These graduates have consistently used their skills to wage a war 
against their own people. Hundreds of thousands of Latin Americans have been tortured, 
raped, assassinated, disappeared, massacred, and forced into refugee by those trained at the 
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SOA.180  
Ríos Montt also studied at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where he received special training in 
counterinsurgency tactics and irregular warfare in 1961, and at the Italian War College (1961-1962). 
After returning to Guatemala, Ríos Montt became President Carlos Arana Osorio’s army chief of staff 
in 1970 and was promoted to general two years later. His career as a military man who attained the 
highest army rank and had abundant overseas experience, learning the latest in military techniques, 
made him an imposing figure within Guatemala even before he came into power. 
Ríos Montt’s rule was greatly influenced not just by his extensive military training, but also 
by his evangelical beliefs, which he gleaned from the church El Verbo, a neo-Pentecostal church that to 
this day is still associated with the California-based Gospel Outreach organization, founded in 1976. El 
Verbo, which began work Guatemala in 1976 when some of its members came to help after the 
devastating earthquake, “preaches obedience through prayer in its work with the impoverished 
Guatemalan Indians.”181 At the time, El Verbo, was one of a growing number of fundamentalist groups 
active in predominantly Roman Catholic Central America; it was “planning several hundred members 
of fundamentalist denominations here to work with Guatemala’s Indian and peasants.”182 In addition, 
they began to provide regular Bible study meetings in the homes of middle- and upper-class residents 
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of Guatemala City.183 In this manner, El Verbo worked with both poor Mayan peoples in rural areas as 
well as rich middle-and upper-class residents in the capital in order to increase their membership.  
Gospel Outreach is characterized by its belief in the promise of individual salvation, 
energetic worship, and the creation of a tight-knit community, all of which attracted not only Ríos 
Montt but also a number of other local residents, including prominent business and political leaders in 
Guatemala.184 James Degolyer, a New Yorker who became an elder within El Verbo, said in a 
interview with The New York Times: “There is an amazing amount of guidance that the Bible gives 
kings, heads of state, in how they should rule.”185 Degolyer also confessed that “he had spent five years 
as a hippie in the Haight-Ashbury district of San Francisco before being ‘saved.’”186 Degolyer is a 
typical example of that counterculture hippie who came to be a conservative Christian by encountering 
Gospel Outreach.  
In 1977, Ríos Montt became a born-again Christian through Bible study meetings given by 
El Verbo. Turek speculates that Ríos Montt’s receptivity to evangelicalism stemmed from “personal 
setbacks linked to government corruption and the ongoing Guatemalan Civil War.”187 These “personal 
setbacks” include Ríos Montt’s run for president on the Christian Democratic ticket in 1974. He lost the 
presidency even though he and his running mate won the majority of votes on a platform of moderate 
reform. In Turek’s estimation, “rampant electoral fraud at the hands of the extreme rightwing 
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Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN) party denied him his victory.”188 After the election, the 
Guatemalan Minister of Defense assigned Ríos Montt to serve as a military attaché in Madrid, Spain in 
order to prevent him from posing a threat to Kjell Laugerud, whose triumph at the polls the MLN and 
sitting president General Carlos Manuel Arana Osorio had coordinated. These setbacks surely fueled 
Ríos Montt’s distrust and disappointment with electoral politics, which changed his direction 
religiously and politically. 
When Laugerud’s successor, General Romeo Lucas García came to power in 1978, political 
turmoil in Guatemala was escalating. Under his regime, “repression became increasingly blind, random, 
and massive.”189 Lucas García justified these outbursts of violence with “Cold War ideology, linking the 
guerrillas with Cuban Communism and characterizing guerrilla successes as progress toward to 
totalitarianism and an existential threat to the state.”190 During Lucas’s regime, a symbolic incident 
occurred in Guatemala City, representative of the escalation of government’s repression against 
indigenous groups in particular. On January 31, 1980, “peasants from northern Quiché—mainly 
Uspantán but also the Ixil towns—had come to the capital to protest the kidnapping of relatives. To draw 
attention to their plight, they occupied the Spanish embassy.”191 The group peacefully occupied the 
Spanish Embassy. Nonetheless, Lucas García authorized a brutal response: he massacred the entire 
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group by burning them alive inside the Embassy.192 Many Guatemalans witnessed the incident through 
TV broadcasts and were visibly shocked. Lucas’s regime’s brutal repression thus provoked international 
condemnation and “further underscored the United States’ decision to suspend aid to Guatemala, a 
sanction that the Carter administration had made earlier on the basis of Guatemala’s abysmal human 
rights record.”193 State violence reached such a nadir that Guatemala came to be even more isolated by 
the international community. 
Ríos Montt’s overly enthusiastic biography, He gives—he takes away (1983), describes his 
bitter experience of the 1974 election and his subsequent exile in Spain, after he refused to join a coup 
as a young officer. It was painful when he was branded a coward.194 Ríos Montt was separated from 
his family “when he was forced to leave the country, when he realized that his career might be 
hopelessly shattered.”195 Ríos Montt was mostly focusing on being a victim of shame. Hearing Ríos 
Montt’ story, El Verbo church pastors Carlos Ramírez and Alvaro Contreras were “deeply moved”196 
Ramírez prayed, “Father, please heal our brother. Take from him this bitterness. Heal these wounds. 
Wash away the years of painful memory. Let Efraín be free so he can serve You with a clean heart.”197 
Ramírez’s prayer of consolation must have healed Ríos Montt’s weary heart in an unprecedented way. 
                                                
192 A Mayan activist and the Nobel Peace Prize winner Rigoberta Menchú’s father Vicente participated 
in the occupation and was killed too (Garrard-Burnett, Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit, 48). 
193 Garrard-Burnett, Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit, 48. 
194 Anfuso and Sczepanski, He gives - he takes away, 90. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Ibid., 91. 
 61 
Ríos Montt has said “Until then I had been trying to reach God. But then God reached down to me and 
accepted me just as I am.”198 
In other words, his political ambition had ended in miserable failure, but was revived after he 
became evangelical. Indeed, he may have used his faith as a tool to reassemble his career in politics. It is possible 
that Ríos Montt truly meant that he felt religiously saved, but he easily connected his religious salvation with 
political success. Therefore, Ríos Montt was using his new religious identity to reinvigorate his political career.  
 For the church elders of El Verbo, Ríos Montt was an attractive celebrity in terms of 
“advertising.” Actually, they confessed that they “guarded themselves against the temptation to use 
Ríos Montt’s name and status for their own purposes, such as drawing more people to the church.”199 
But this seems like an “official” statement. In fact, one of the authors of Ríos Montt’s biography as well 
as the director of Gospel Outreach, Joseph Anfuso, emphasized that “the publicity given General Ríos 
Montt’s conversion had probably made it seem more successful than it was.”200 Their connection was 
tight long before the beginning of Ríos Montt’s presidency, but the church elders must have desired to 
increase their membership and enhance their presence by collaborating with Ríos Montt nonetheless. 
He gives—he takes away was published by Gospel Outreach, after all. So we ought not interpret it too 
literally. With this caveat in mind, though, the book can serve as a valuable primary resource when 
examining the intersection of El Verbo’s theology and Ríos Montt’s politics. 
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One of Ríos Montt’s first acts as president was to suspend the constitution and to appoint two 
ordained El Verbo elders, Francisco Bianchi and Alvaro Contreras, to specially created “ad hoc positions 
as ‘secretary to the private affairs of the president’ and ‘secretary of the president of the republic.’”201 
Bianchi and Contreras were both native Guatemalans and their primary work was, as the official 
biography puts it, “to walk in covenant with Ríos Montt, to speak openly and honestly with him in a 
spirit of love, and always to keep before him the principles of Scripture.”202 According to a different 
source, The New York Times, “The President refers to them as ‘my conscience,’ and outside of the 
military they are regarded as the most powerful men in the presidential entourage.”203 These men helped 
Ríos Montt to maintain his authenticity as an evangelical. This fact can be connected to Francis Schaffer’s 
position that politics should be conducted on the basis of the absolute standards of Christian values, not 
the arbitrary standards of secular humanism. Ríos Montt often identified himself in precisely this way: “I 
am only a Christian—and a Christian is a honorable man of character who has respect for others and 
who carries out the Word of God. It is true I govern with Biblical principles. But Christian principles are 
also good legal principles.”204 Ríos Montt recognized Biblical principles as the supreme political 
principles, the basis for all national politics.  
Bianchi and Contreras kept playing pivotal roles in Ríos Montt’s presidency until he was 
ousted by another coup on August 8, 1983. Their influence clearly stands opposed to the separation of 
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politics and religion, which is a fundamental principle of any democratic regime. But this was the least of 
the problems facing Guatemala at the time. Indeed, on April 15, 1982, Ríos Montt issued Executive 
Decree 9-82, which prohibited the dissemination of news about political violence. This was evidence 
that Ríos Montt would attempt something that he wanted to hide from people. In other words, he knew 
that military action in the Guatemalan highlands would invite criticism of his regime.  
While Ríos Montt was enforcing news blackouts about military violence, he made sure to 
utilize mass media for his own ends. Within days of taking office on March 23, Ríos Montt began 
delivering television speeches broadcasted weekly on Sunday nights. They were his discursos del 
domingo, which were also known as “sermons.” Ríos Montt addressed his audience “about love, the 
family, abstinence from alcohol and other moral issues.”205 This meant to “establish the framework for 
a New Guatemala and, indeed, a new Guatemalan.”206 These programs were full of Ríos Montt’s 
evangelical moral discourse, which touched upon not only politics and the economy, but also matters of 
family life and health. Ironically, Ríos Montt often emphasized the importance of peace:  
The peace of Guatemala depends on you, señor, on you, señora, on you, niño, on you, niña, 
yes, the peace of Guatemala is in your heart. As soon as you have peace in your heart, there 
will be peace in your house, and when there is peace in your house, there will be peace in 
society. Your tranquility and your peace, the peace of Guatemala does not depend on arms.207 
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National security, it seems, depends only on the peace of the individual mind, even including the minds 
of children. Ríos Montt’s rhetoric calls to mind Billy Graham’s logic: “saved souls lead to a saved 
nation.”208 Ríos Montt imposed the responsibility to maintain national security on individuals, not on 
government. Like Graham, he emphasized personal morality and individual responsibility in politics. In 
this message there is also a veiled warning, too: the last part implies that if you (Guatemalans) do not 
have tranquility and peace, then the government will resort to the use of arms to restore peace in 
Guatemala. Ríos Montt’s logic was simple, even primitive, but that is precisely why it might have been 
appealing.  
In his sermons, Ríos Montt called for the restoration of morality for individuals and families. 
At the same time, though, he expanded the meaning of the people’s right to bring about order: 
Poverty and ignorance are the fruits of moral disorder, economics and injustice, of anarchy 
and oppression. Misery and ignorance are the fruits of this family disequilibrium. Because of 
this it is important that the struggle against subversion, against ignorance and misery is a must, 
but it is not a monopoly of the state; it is also your own responsibility and right.209 
Ríos Montt attempted to exempt the government from responsibility for social ills, such as poverty and 
ignorance. He emphasized the morality of individual and family to solve precisely these problems. Ríos 
Montt equated right with responsibility. This is a logical sleight-of-hand that was used to justify political 
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violence at every level, because if the people refuse to live up to their responsibility, then the government 
can punish them. 
 After coming into power, Ríos Montt embarked on a campaign to turn the negative image of 
previous, corrupt governments into a positive image of the “government as champion and guardian of 
law and order.”210 He sought to recover the trust and support of the people as soon as possible. On the 
night of 12 March 1982, Ríos Montt commanded “an end to the random and ubiquitous violence and 
decreed that there would be no cadavers on roadsides.”211 As a result of his order, “the next day, 
political murder in and around the capital dropped sharply.”212 The New York Time reported: 
kidnappings and killings in the cities have declined dramatically and there is less repression of 
politicians, foreign correspondents and Roman Catholic priests. But diplomats, religious 
leaders and many Guatemalans assert that Government forces are killing more peasant 
Indians.213 
This indicates that Ríos Montt could suppress political violence in capital easily because of his authority 
within the city. But this may have masked an escalated battle between the army and communist 
guerrillas in the broader countryside, which continued the brutal policies of the previous regime. 
On May 24, 1982, Ríos Montt announced an amnesty for all guerrillas and collaborators 
who turned themselves in by July 1. Before amnesty set in, Ríos Montt gave a sermon on April 18: “It 
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is very easy to define concepts of politics and philosophy, but to live in reality means that one’s own 
interests be detached, and see how we want to make a Guatemalan society reality [...] from this 
Tuesday amnesty is in effect, and amnesty is the spirit of the law.”214 Ríos Montt continued: “But for 
that, you and I must have a reunion, we must have a reconciliation, we must feed the roots, the roots of 
a greater Guatemala which only happens when you renounce your interests and I renounce my pride, 
but it is achieved when you believe in God.”215 In these two passages one of which I have already 
quoted above, Ríos Montt is speaking to rebels and malcontents. He said that they should put aside their 
political and possibly economic interests and live in the real world. This likely meant that Ríos Montt 
believed that the demands made by these people were unrealistic. But Ríos Montt did not offer 
anything that might address the demands of rebels and others who were clamoring for reforms and 
change. 
The second passage says that for amnesty to truly happen rebels and all those who protested 
or desired change, had to conform with the laws and express a common faith in God, in effect 
surrendering their interests and accepting a Christian God. This was not an invitation to negotiation, but 
actually a subtle ultimatum. Ríos Montt and the government would not change, but the rebels and 
protestors must change. Ríos Montt’s religious identity made it impossible for him to compromise or 
negotiate because doing so would require that he also compromise his religious beliefs. This is a good 
example of how a person’s religious beliefs can make it difficult for them to politically compromise 
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when religious identity is combined with political identity. That is to say, religious faith was superior to 
anything else for Ríos Montt. 
Although the amnesty seemed at the time like a peaceful strategy for restraining guerrilla 
activity, it proved to be but the prelude to a bloody counterinsurgency campaign in the Guatemalan 
highlands. Garrard-Burnett points out the pragmatic purpose behind this decision in terms of moral 
efficacy: “[a]s a symbolic gesture, the moral efficacy of the amnesty law was twofold: first, it provided 
an opportunity for the “prodigal sons” of the armed resistance to return themselves to their father’s house. 
At the same time, it offered a moral rationale for a “just war” against those who did not.”216 By offering 
the amnesty, Ríos Montt could create the impression that he was a generous and fair leader and not a 
brutal dictator. According to this logic, he thus earned a kind of legitimate right to attack guerrilla groups 
who did not accept the amnesty. It was dubious morality in the service of purely military victory. Ríos 
Montt made another speech about the amnesty in his weekly sermon on June 20, 1982:  
What I want to say is […] the amnesty wants to offer pardon […], it wants to pardon; the 
fatherland wants to pardon; it is extending its arm; your embrace, your lap that your children 
return to; homes await the presence of its members. We take advantage of the amnesty that 
wants to offer pardon. He that pardons is noble and the person who accepts it is a noble 
person; we make our patria something noble. We reconcile, we make our family the root of 
the country.217 
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With such rhetoric, Ríos Montt played the role of the merciful father offering forgiveness to his 
rebellious sons—the guerrillas. Describing political problems as family affairs was his common strategy: 
it took serious political issues and trivialized them. At the same time, Ríos Montt could describe himself 
as the ultimate arbitrator—the only one who could unite a Guatemala divided by guerillas. In reality, of 
course, he made the divisions even worse.  
 Ríos Montt went from being a “merciful father” to a “furious father” towards the sons who 
did not accept his forgiveness. As he put it in his sermon of June 30, 1982: 
Listen well, Guatemalans. We are going to combat the subversion by whatever means we 
want […] totally just, but at the same time with energy and vigor […] We are prepared to 
change Guatemala, we are prepared to do so with honesty and justice, peace and respect for 
those who are peaceful and respect the law, [but] prison and death to those who plant [the 
seeds] of criminality, violence and treachery.218  
Ríos Montt classified the people of Guatemala in two groups: people to be protected and people to be 
attacked. This logical duality does not allow for any grey zone. It is rooted in a moral discourse of saints 
and sinners, with no area in between. In fact, this sermon announced a campaign against “the subversives” 
entitled “Fusiles y Frijoles (Rifles and Beans or Bullets and Beans).” It was the first phase of a 
scorched-earth campaign, “Victoria 82,” which marked the most extreme violence that swept the country 
in the name of counterinsurgency. With it, the Mayan holocaust had begun. 
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As its name suggests, Fusiles y Frijoles consisted of two military strategies. The fusiles (rifles 
or bullets) represented “[t]he villages that the army assess to be sympathetic or supportive of the 
guerrillas are occupied, punished (either through the selective killing of individuals linked to the 
guerrillas or by the elimination of the entire population), and the fields, homes, and possessions of the 
villagers burned to the ground.”219 While fusiles was a genocidal program, frijoles (beans) was, in 
essence, a forced re-education project. The villagers fleeing as refugees from the zones of conflict sought 
protection under the army’s control in model villages (resettlement villages) and development poles. 
Model villages and development poles were “high security areas built to serve as forms of population 
control—moving the displaced from camps into model programs—meant to ‘integrate’ the local 
indigenous population into both the anti-subversive fight and the ‘nationalist’ security and development 
project.”220 In other words, these villages worked as sites for the reorientation of Mayan peoples. It was 
were they would be remade as preferable citizens ready for the project of national unity, which Ríos 
Montt had emphasized in his evangelical preaching.  
According to Garrard-Burnett, refugees were given Spanish courses, made to watch 
anticommunist films, and undertook lessons in patriotism. They were also forced to engage in 
ideological talks with tutors overseen by the military. At the same time, the army prohibited villagers 
from conducting traditional community rituals.221 Thus, the army controlled peoples’ lives and minds in 
the rural highlands. But there was one important exception to this regimented existence: Mayan people 
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were allowed to attend Protestant churches. They “formed freely in the model villages, a factor that in 
itself may account in part for the enormous increase in Protestant church growth, not only in the zones of 
conflict but all over rural Guatemala during this period.”222 This fact shows that Protestantism 
functioned as one of the mechanisms used to promote the new idea of national unity: evangelical 
churches played a role in destroying Mayan culture as well as in infusing anticommunist ideology and 
patriotism into Mayan communities. All of this was based on Ríos Montt’s vision of La Nueva 
Guatemala. 
The most remarkable element of the Fusiles y Frijoles campaign was the expansion of targets 
the military was allowed to pursue. The New York Times reported Ríos Montt’s response to a question 
about a massacre killed about 300 Mayan peoples in rural highlands: “The problem of war is not just a 
question of who is shooting. For each one who is shooting there are 10 working behind him.” His press 
secretary amplified this remark: “The guerrillas won over many Indian collaborators. Therefore, the 
Indian were subversives […] Clearly, you had to kill Indians because they were collaborating with 
subversion.”223 This was the common justification for killing Mayan peoples. It hinged on equating 
them with guerrillas. On this issue, The CEH concluded: 
[T]he State deliberately magnified the military threat of the insurgency, a practice justified by 
the concept of the internal enemy. The inclusion of all opponents under one banner, 
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democratic or otherwise, pacifist or guerrilla, legal or illegal, communist or noncommunist, 
served to justify numerous and serious crimes.224  
As a result of this stretched interpretation of the internal enemy, the target area of the army dramatically 
expanded, which accordingly led Ríos Montt to pursue further military action that resulted in the Mayan 
genocide.  
Just who was the internal enemy, who were the subversives, Ríos Montt was so set on 
eliminating? Forensic anthropologist Victoria Sanford has argued:  
the state originally identified individuals who directly challenged the state (such as opposition 
party leaders, student leaders and unionists) as subversives. As time went on, the category of 
“subversive” was increasingly expansive and included all who provided services to the poor 
and the poor themselves, which placed the Maya as the “internal enemy” in National Security 
Doctrine.225 
The National Security Doctrine (DSN), which turned almost anyone into a potential subversive, was 
the cornerstone of Ríos Montt’s anti-insurgency agenda. As the CEH put it: “Anti-communism and the 
National Security Doctrine (DSN) formed part of the anti-Soviet strategy of the United States in Latin 
America. In Guatemala, these were first expressed as anti-reformist, then anti-democratic policies, 
culminating in criminal counterinsurgency.”226 In addition, the CEH concluded: “[d]uring the armed 
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confrontation, the State’s idea of the ‘internal enemy,’ intrinsic to the National Security Doctrine, 
became increasingly inclusive. At the same time, this doctrine became the raison d’etre of Army and 
State policies for several decades.”227 The National Security Doctrine provided legitimacy to attack 
anyone who was thought to be associated with communism.  
But why were Mayan peoples so frequently targeted as the internal enemy? Ríos Montt 
argued that Guatemala, as a country “broken up into ‘twenty-two nations’—a reference to the nation’s 
nearly two dozen indigenous languages—was lacking in any overarching sense of national identity or 
unity, consisting only of loosely articulated self-serving individuals and parochial ethnic clans.”228 As 
previously mentioned, Ríos Montt’s presidency was based on three essential elements: “morality, order 
and discipline, and national unity.”229 For Ríos Montt and the ruling class of Guatemala, the existence of 
Mayan peoples was an “obstacle” to national unity. On this point, Sanford conveys the confession of an 
officer who had ordered and participated in dozens of massacres: “The Indian problem. Who can tell us 
what to do about it? They are ignorant. They are dirty. They don’t even speak Spanish. We made some 
mistakes, but we had to terminate the guerrilla.”230 Such thinking clearly shows that Mayan peoples 
were seen as inferior and subversive by military officers.  
 This racial prejudice against Mayan peoples in Guatemala has its roots in the colonial era. 
Mayan peoples, who have twenty-two sub-groups, make up about 60% of the Guatemalan population. 
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Mayan peoples are the discriminated majority while economic and political power is held largely by 
Ladinos. As Melander puts it, “A deep division separates the indigenous population, which identify 
themselves with the traditional Maya culture, and the Ladinos, which identify with the ‘white’ Western 
culture. Many Ladinos view the difference in terms of race and consequently despise the Mayas as 
inferiors.”231 The Mayan population provides the plantations in the highlands and the Pacific coast with 
a large amount of the seasonal labor force needed for the harvest of crops like coffee. The rest of the 
year they cultivate their own subsistence crops on small plots of land called milpa (cornfields). The 
Pacific coast and the highlands are thus “integrated in a production system of latifundios (large cash 
crop estates owned by landlords) and minifundios (small subsistence crop farming).”232 Mayan peoples 
are impoverished, and are forced to look for additional income. “The poverty of the Mayas 
consequently has a function within this system.”233  
The Guatemalan economic and political elite to a large extent consists of descendents of 
European and North American immigrants, who have arrived in Guatemala during the last hundred 
years. Guatemalan society is characterized by mass poverty, large class differences, and ethnic division, 
all of which has its background in the Spanish Empire, with its system of control and exploitation of 
nature and people. However, “the maintenance of these structures has to do with developments after 
independence from Spain in 1821, basically the expanding agrarian capitalism and the efforts to create 
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Guatemalan nation-state.”234 After ousting Spanish rule, the United States came to dominate 
Guatemalan economy and politics. During Manuel Estrada Cabrera’s regime (1898-1920), the “banana 
empire” was established. At the center of monopoly was the United Fruit Company (UFCO), which 
was both the largest employer and the largest landowner in Guatemala. UFCO controlled Guatemalan’s 
railway system and port facilities, which largely determined the Guatemalan economy.235 
Under the presidencies of Juan José Arévalo (1945-1951) and Jacobo Arbenz (1951-1954), 
the Guatemalan government started a process of recovering control from U.S. economic domination. 
The 1950 agricultural census showed that “72 percent of the agricultural land in the country was 
controlled by slightly more than 2 percent of the farming units.”236 To redress this remarkable 
imbalance, after Arévalo’s moderate reforms, Arbenz launched a land reform to modernize 
infrastructure of the country. The Agrarian Reform Law decree 900 was implemented in 1952, which 
stated all uncultivated land belonging to properties larger than 672 acres should be expropriated. As a 
result, “about 500,000 of Guatemala’s 3 million inhabitants had benefited from the land reform.”237  
Arbenz also undertook the construction of new roads and a new port on the Caribbean coast. In addition, 
Arbenz’s decided to legalize Guatemala’s Communist Party and purchased arms from Czechoslovakia, 
which fueled U.S. policymakers’ concern about communist influence in Guatemala. These threats 
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provoked CIA-sponsored coup in 1954 to oust Arbenz. As a result, Arbenz resigned and his reforms 
ended.238 After the Arbenz administration, in a short time, “the new regime had covered up all tracks of 
the Guatemalan revolution and transformed the country to one of the most repressive and regressive 
states in Latin America. The land redistributed to landless peasants was taken back and given to its 
former owners.”239 Steigenga suggests that “Guatemala’s experiment with democracy and reform had 
come to an end. The next thirty years would be shaped by a succession of military dictatorships.”240 In 
this manner, the seeds of the Guatemalan Civil War were planted around the time of the demise of the 
Arbenz regime. 
 Among the many seeds of the war were racist beliefs about Mayan peoples and their 
perceived resistance to national integration.241 Ríos Montt mobilized this perception and intensified it. 
He pursued the elimination of Mayan populations in order to build La Nueva Guatemala. Ríos Montt 
gave a symbolic statement about his position against communist guerrillas shortly after he took power: 
“The guerrilla is the fish. The people are the sea […], [i]f you cannot catch the fish, you have to drain 
the sea.”242 This statement clearly suggests that Ríos Montt aimed to exterminate guerrillas by 
converting their supporters even if it meant destroying the way of life of innocent Mayan peoples. 
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Both the Lucas García and Ríos Montt regimes conducted counterinsurgency campaigns 
with mass killings against Mayan peoples, but their approaches were different. Lucas García’s 
counterinsurgency campaigns called for “100 percent random slaughter.”243 On the other hand, 
according to Jennifer Schirmer, Ríos Montt’s pacification strategy included the military government’s 
aid to loyal Guatemalans—the frijoles of the Fusiles y Frijoles campaign.244 The soft pacification of 
frijoles included the religious conversion of the indigenous people. This is where Ríos Montt saw an opportunity 
to involve American evangelicals in his “soft” strategies for the pacification of the indigenous people of 
Guatemala. Evangelical churches and schools were pathways for indigenous people to escape becoming part of 
the “total kill” aspect of Ríos Montt’s counterinsurgency campaigns. 
 The most controversial system in Fusiles y Frijoles campaign was the use of civilian militias, 
known as PACs (Patrullas de Autodefensa). PACs consisted mainly of Mayan males who served in the 
patrols on a mandatory basis. Although civil patrols have a long history in the highlands, the PACs 
system “did not become widespread until April 1982, when Ríos Montt made the formation of civil 
patrols a centerpiece of his pacification program.”245 In fact, by 1982-1983, PACs comprised 
“approximately 900,000 peasants between the age of fifteen and sixty years, representing nearly 80 
percent of the male population in indigenous rural areas.”246 The army intended to use PACs “to seal 
off communities from potential guerrilla penetration as well as remove the guerrillas from areas where 
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they had already established a presence.”247 The PACs members were forcibly recruited and under the 
supervision of the military. “Many communities had no choice but to accept the organization of the 
civil patrols under threat that otherwise the army would eliminate them.”248 PACs worked as informers 
from inside the Mayan communities. This was the cruel element of PACs insofar as it destroyed the 
social bonds of Mayan communities from within, sowing distrust and terror in people’s minds. 
Garrard-Burnett points out that PACs were designed to provide “back-up support for the army in its 
military and counterinsurgency operations, using locals’ knowledge of terrain, language and the 
inhabitants to boost the effectiveness in the field.”249 As a result, the PACs system was extremely 
effective. “By isolating the guerrillas from their base of indigenous support and thereby weakening 
them nearly to the point of capitulation.”250 At the same time, the PACs system left the serious damage 
in Mayan communities, which continues to this day:  
Without doubt, one of the most lasting effects of the civil patrol system was its effect on 
community cohesion, a consequence—perhaps unintended but perhaps not—that in either 
case helped to advance the government’s expressed goal of achieving unidad nacional 
[national unity] at the expense of indigenous and community identity.251 
This is different from what Ríos Montt had said about amnesty and his own experience with conversion. Ríos 
Montt only offered amnesty to those who abandoned their Mayan identities. In this regard, the PAC system 
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reflected the anti-Mayan suspicions of the ruling class. Ríos Montt never accepted Mayan identity as a morally 
equal compatriot alongside Christian, or evangelical identity, Ríos Montt’s continued to believe that “poverty 
and ignorance are the fruits of moral disorder,” which meant that it was the responsibility of Mayan peoples to 
submit to conversion in order to be saved.252 When this did not work, Ríos Montt used force to make Mayan 
peoples convert; this was not problematic, because it was for their own good, he maintained. In this way Ríos 
Montt justified the PACs strategy, even though many Mayans communities suffered as a result of it. 
Under the government’s call for the national unity, Mayan peoples were forced to sacrifice 
their ethnic identity and the unity of the communities. The CEH concluded: 
the massacres, scorched earth operations, forced disappearances and executions of Mayan 
authorities, leaders and spiritual guides, were not only an attempt to destroy the social base 
of the guerrillas, but above all, to destroy the cultural values that ensured cohesion and 
collective action in Mayan communities.253 
This conclusion clearly admits that the essence of Ríos Montt’s military campaign was a genocidal 
project aimed at eliminating both Mayan populations and their cultures under the dubious goals of 
achieving national unity. During Ronald Reagan’s visit to Guatemala in December 1982, Ríos Montt 
confessed the difficulty of achieving national unity, which outsiders never understood: “Guatemala is a 
different kind of country, and we have to remember that we are 70 percent Indian, we have to live it and 
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we have to manifest it; if not, then the communists are going to destroy us.”254 He admitted the 
uniqueness of Guatemalan nation—the diversity of Mayan population—but he saw it only as a 
drawback, as something rather dangerous that attracts communism.  
As a result of the rapid expansion of Protestantism in Guatemala beginning with the 1976 
earthquake, by the early 1980s the Protestant population in Guatemala reached “nearly 30 percent and 
still growing, making it the most Protestant country in all of Spanish-speaking Latin America.”255 
Rather than interpret this as a result of brutal military policy, some evangelicals took it such 
unprecedented growth as a sign of God’s special benediction and prophetic destiny for the long 
troubled country. They launched a church growth movement (known as iglecrecimiento) called “God’s 
hour for Guatemala,” and certain sectors of the Guatemalan evangelical community depicted Ríos 
Montt as the leader of this movement.256  
The dramatic expansion of Protestantism, along with Guatemala having its first born-again 
president, made evangelicals think they were in a prophetic moment. This belief had an effect on Ríos 
Montt’s discourse: “his sense of his own prophetic role seemed to have been burnished by the 
iglecrecimientistas [activists of the church growth movement]”257 He went on the record saying, “God 
gives power to whomever he wants, and he gave it to me.”258 Ríos Montt repeatedly emphasized that 
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he was a divinely anointed leader, somebody chosen for a difficult task. By mid-1982, he began to 
speak of “a unique covenantal relationship between a loving but angry God and every Guatemalan.”259 
He stated: 
God loves us, God loves Guatemala, God loves you, and those whom he loves he disciplines, 
he loves and he smites [golpea], so that you wake up and react and start to look for what 
truly matters, that you reconsider your importance, your humility, you reconcile yourself 
with him, your creator, with your king, with your Lord.260 
With such language, Ríos Montt described God not only as the embodiment of love but also of 
strictness and judgment. In his discourses, God is generous, fearful, and powerful—all at the same time.  
 Ríos Montt appealed to narratives of salvation that hinged on obedience to God’s discipline.  
Such narratives were also used to justify any “punishment” (such as counterinsurgency campaigns) in 
the name of God. Ríos Montt gave the impression that he was a prophet sent to convey God’s discipline 
and vision to all Guatemalans. Among the principles—morality, order and discipline, national 
unity—most often used by Ríos Montt to justify the Mayan genocide, first and foremost was national 
unity. By this he meant something like a unified national identity, but his language was imbued with 
religious overtones. Ríos Montt persistently used the phrase “hacer Guatemala (to make Guatemala).” 
He said, “We are going to make [hacer] Guatemala, we make Guatemala, we make it […] It will be 
grand, sovereign, and independent and when we have the strength, the consistency, and our own dignity, 
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we will be Guatemalans.”261 For Ríos Montt, Guatemala was a work in progress, one that only he 
could lead. Mayan peoples, represented a threat to the national unity Ríos Montt envisioned. For him, 
national cohesion and consistency had to be achieved by and through evangelical faith. By repeating 
the phrase “hacer Guatemala,” he attempted to imprint upon the people an image of national unity that 
was in keeping with Christian universalism. 
For all his sermonizing, Ríos Montt often overlooked and covered up his own moral failures: 
In fact, he even used his sermons to obfuscate and rationalize his actions and that of the army: 
However, we have also tried to believe in each Guatemalans, you should be aware of what 
really happens, we should not call ourselves deceitful, we are not lying, we are not stealing, 
we are not abusing; we are teaching, we are saying that the situations are critical, and this is a 
situation whose responsibility is yours and mine.262  
In this statement Ríos Montt tried to refute the idea that he and the army were committing abuses and 
crimes. He did so by suggesting that the situation was not of his making. He tried to avoid taking 
responsibility for the civil war. Even though Ríos Montt said that responsibility was shared, he denied 
that he and his government abused anyone. In fact, Ríos Montt insisted that what he and his government 
were doing was actually a form of teaching, not abusing.  
 In another sermon, this one given on November 7, 1982, Ríos Montt even blamed the people 
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for demanding too much from the government:  
The people have been wrongly taught; telling them for example, that the State has sufficient 
money and resources to cover all the needs of employment, and to satisfy all the needs of a 
housing and food and not only that it has these resources, but also has the large obligation to 
give work, homes and food, when citizens have no where to get them.263 
Ríos Montt also blamed outsiders for the problems that gripped Guatemala: “here in Guatemala are 
many marginalized persons, there are sadly millions of persons that are not receiving the benefits of 
learning to be responsible, these are people that lately, listen well, lately have been taught by an enemy 
cunning and tireless, to demand their rights.”264  
 Ríos Montt’s religious ideas—his belief in personal responsibility and divine providence, for 
example—made him deaf to the demands of people clamoring for social and political rights. Because 
Ríos Montt believed that religious morality was more important than civil rights, he could dismiss 
people who do not subordinate themselves to his religious ideals because they were not learning what 
was proper for them to be good citizens. This made it easy for Ríos Montt to blame the people for 
wanting too much, for demanding rights or better jobs. The people should be content with whatever the 
government gives them. Ríos Montt wanted his subjects to stay in their proper place. This also meant 
that Ríos Montt did not see himself as having to answer to the people, but rather, the people had to 
answer to him. 
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Evangelical Mission: To Support a “Brother in Christ” 
Ríos Montt was a capable image creator. In December 1982, he launched an anti-corruption 
campaign: Project David, named after the biblical king. He created a logo of “government as champion 
and guardian of law and order”: a blue hand with the thumb, index, and middle fingers extended against 
a field of white which symbolizes the pledge “I don’t steal. I don’t lie. I don’t abuse.” This pledge was 
demanded from all officials in order to eradicate corruption. According to Garrard-Burnett, “[w]ithin 
the city, the three-fingered salute became a signifier of order and stability, the visual and somatic 
representation of the New Guatemala.”265 Newsweek reported: “By next year, millions of the blue-hand 
symbols will appear on billboards, bumper stickers, pencils and postage stamps across the country.”266 
Ríos Montt’s strategy successfully shaped and propagated his image as a “clean” president, which 
appealed to Guatemalans as well as to the U.S. government. This strategy helped draw support from 
evangelicals in the U.S. At the same time, the symbolic logo he created was quite effective to imprint 
Ríos Montt’s powerful leadership into Guatemalan minds.  
The Guatemalan government received no overt military aid from the U.S. because the Carter 
administration suspended aid in 1977, due to the Guatemalan government’s continued violations of its 
citizen’s human rights. Actually though, the U.S. steadily supported Guatemala clandestinely, by 
delivering weapons and ammunition as part of $8.5 million in financial aid through third-party proxies 
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such as Israel and Taiwan.267 In December, 1982, Ronald Reagan visited Ríos Montt to negotiate the 
resumption of formal U.S. military aid to Guatemala—“beginning with helicopter parts for the airships 
that were most widely used in the counterinsurgency campaign to move troops into remote areas—in 
return for Ríos Montt’s pledge to force the military to impose greater discipline on its troops.”268 
Offering helicopter parts to Guatemala was a controversial issue in the U.S. Congress. Ríos Montt 
explained that his plan was to use helicopter parts for “humanitarian work such as airlifting food to 
Indian farmers who have fled from their homes for fear of violence by subversive forces, transportation 
of brigades of doctors and social workers who provide services to refugees, and other comparable 
tasks.”269 Ríos Montt’s emphasis on using helicopter parts only for humanitarian efforts helped to 
assuage Ronald Reagan’s concerns over the issue. In addition, Ríos Montt claimed that human rights 
abuses such as massacres, kidnappings, and torture, which were reported by news media and human 
rights organizations, were being committed by guerrillas, not by the Guatemalan army.270 Despite 
abundant evidence to the contrary, Ríos Montt’s eloquence was all it took to convince Reagan. After 
meeting with Ríos Montt, Reagan was assured: “I know he wants to improve the quality of life for all 
Guatemalans and to promote social justice. My administration will do all it can to support his 
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progressive efforts,” he said.271 In addition, when Reagan was asked about human rights violations in 
Guatemala he said: “I am inclined to believe they’ve been getting a bum rap.”272 For Reagan and 
American evangelicals it was more convenient to believe Ríos Montt than the evidence. 
It has been suggested that Ríos Montt might have received guidance from his church elders 
about how to present himself as a clean, powerful, reliable leader. Watching him on video, he seems to 
be fond of dramatic gestures, like a stage actor. He is also eloquent, inviting comparison to famous 
televangelists, including Billy Graham. Ríos Montt was charismatic and attracted a certain type of 
person, namely the obedient. But he could not win over everybody. Despite his “successful” meeting 
with Ronald Reagan, according to Garrard-Burnett, the U.S. Congress ultimately refused to resume aid 
to Guatemala.273  
There is another fact to consider in this context. In January, 1983, the U.S. removed the arms 
embargo to Guatemala. This decision was based on an investigation, in which three delegations from 
the U.S. Congress visited Guatemala to see the level of respect for human rights in the country. While 
Democratic participants expressed dissatisfaction, Republican participants had a very favorable 
impression, probably because they did not visit Guatemalan refugee camps in Mexico. The result of 
this investigation was that the Republicans wanted increased cooperation with Guatemala, while 
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Democrats opposed it.274 This divergence of opinion stemmed mainly from the fact that Democrats 
and Republicans did not share a criteria with which to judge the situation properly, and also because 
their investigation was not sufficient. If they had observed the more devastated areas and heard directly 
from victims, they probably would not have supported Ríos Montt’s dictatorship. 
Attempting to explain why the Reagan administration ignored human rights violations 
against Mayan peoples as well as rising criticism from human rights organizations and media, Turek 
claims that “U.S. foreign policy makers and the Reagan administration cautiously embraced [Ríos 
Montt’s] leadership, finding his religiously infused rhetoric moderate in comparison to previous 
regimes and his commitment to fighting the ‘communist insurgency’ encouraging.”’275 In other words, 
the Reagan administration prioritized Ríos Montt’s counterinsurgency, which was based on Cold War 
ideology, as well as Ríos Montt’s comparatively “clean” image, which was shaped by Christianity, over 
and above the protection of human rights.  
It did not help that the U.S. government failed to collect proper information about the state of 
violence in Guatemala. As Garrard-Burnett indicates, “U.S. officials did not have a reasonably clear 
sense of the extent of the violence in the countryside and did not know ‘who was doing what to 
whom.’”276 This reflects the priority that fighting communism in Latin America had over what was 
happening to victims during the Guatemalan Civil War. Also, there were fewer reports of human rights 
violations by humanitarian organizations and media coverage of the Guatemalan Civil War compared 
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to events surrounding the campaigns of the Sandinista of Nicaragua and the Farabundo Marti National 
Liberation Front of El Salvador. The revolutionary movements in Nicaragua and El Salvador were 
viewed as more urgent threats to the U.S. As Melander points out, in January, 1982, the Reagan 
administration escalated its military support to Central America. The U.S. government prioritized 
support for the Contras in Nicaragua and counterinsurgency in El Salvador. The Reagan administration 
considered the Guatemalan counterinsurgency to be subordinate to those two countries’ wars.277 
Perhaps because budget, diplomatic efforts, and attention were spent more on Nicaragua and El 
Salvador, Guatemala remained slightly out of U.S. focus.  
In the place of insufficient U.S. government support, Guatemala obtained a great amount of 
aid from evangelicals in the U.S. U.S.-based Pentecostal churches supported Ríos Montt’s presidency 
both spiritually and financially. As The New York Times reported at the time, Ríos Montt’s church, El 
Verbo, actively participated in his military project:  
In Indian villages in the Quiche province, church members are helping the army with food 
distribution, part of the President’s two-pronged counterinsurgency strategy of military and 
civic action. And, in California, the church is raising money to build several “cities of refuge” 
in the highlands to house thousands of Indians whose villages have been destroyed as a 
result of the army’s “scorched earth” strategy.278 
This is a great irony: church members helped to reconstruct Mayan peoples’ lives, which had been 
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destroyed by their “brother,” Ríos Montt. Indeed, El Verbo’s mother church, Gospel Outreach, founded 
a relief branch, International Love Lift, which was heavily promoted on Pat Robertson’s 700 Club.279 It 
received and channeled economic aid to Guatemala from churches in the U.S. On September 1, 1982, 
El Verbo’s leader Carlos Ramírez described Ríos Montt’s regime as “God’s miracle in Guatemala” in 
his letter distributed by International Love Lift:  
I want you to realize just how strategic Guatemala is in relationship to the United States and 
this hemisphere […] if Guatemala falls, what then? Mexico […] This [donation] will bless 
Guatemala and show the world that when a nation turns to God, and God’s people unite, His 
marvelous plan is fulfilled.280 
This letter echoed the common rhetoric of the era. It played on evangelical fears that Guatemala might 
fall into the hands of communists, that it might be another El Salvador or Nicaragua. In addition, it 
suggested that Guatemala was still a country that could be saved from the contamination of 
communism, if only American evangelicals would get involved.   
 Ramírez urged American evangelicals to engage in reconstruction efforts in Guatemala to 
build La Nueva Guatemala under the name of God. Their donations would support evangelical 
principles and help in the fight against communism. Ramírez claimed that “Ríos Montt has deep 
feelings for his people, especially the Indians ‘who have been abandoned for hundreds of years.’ 
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Human rights have improved since Ríos Montt took office.”281 We cannot take this statement literally. 
It is necessary to understand that the evangelical interpretation of human rights then was not the same 
as what we might define as human rights today. For example, in December 1982, a group of North 
Americans interviewed El Verbo’s pastor, who told them: “The Army doesn’t massacre the Indians. It 
massacres demons, and the Indians are demon possessed: they are communists.”282 In other words, the 
slaughter of Mayan peoples is justified because they are demons who were equated with communists, 
which meant that they were outside the jurisdiction of human rights and could be rightfully killed. 
Theology came before policy. As Ríos Montt announced when he came to power, the foundation of his 
morality was based on his religious identity: “I am trusting my Lord and my King, that He shall guide 
me.”283 Ríos Montt protected human rights because he believed in God: “we are guaranteeing human 
rights,” he proclaimed in his sermons.284 His belief was a kind of talisman, it would not allow him to 
violate human rights. Of course, this suggests that Ríos Montt thought he could only be judged by God 
alone. In this light, Ríos Montt was, more than anything, a religious leader, the embodiment of God’s 
justice.  
During this time, Ramírez was “meeting with church leaders and fellowship groups 
throughout the United States. He was promoting the image of Ríos Montt as the ‘hand of God’ at 
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work.”285 Ramírez propagated Ríos Montt’s image as a savior of Guatemala as well as a merciful 
guardian for Mayan peoples—all in order to draw more donations from American evangelicals. In 
reality, Ríos Montt massacred or forcibly re-educated Mayan peoples who refused to be converted to 
Pentecostalism. Only converts were protected by the government based on a policy of “conditional” 
human rights. In this manner, Ríos Montt and Ramírez limited the concept of human rights, applying it 
to only those Mayan peoples who accepted evangelical faith and discarded their indigenous identity. 
Ramírez pleaded for financial help—as well as helicopter parts—from American evangelicals: “Our 
brother Efraín inherited a bankrupt country with an ill-equipped army which needs helicopter parts. I 
need ‘mercy helicopters’ to go out to the villages to help my brothers.”286 In this context, “brothers” 
signify not only government soldiers but also, supposedly, Mayan peoples. Ramírez emphasized the 
importance of helicopter parts being used for “good” purposes but which were also used in the 
massacres of Mayan peoples in mountainous area.  
The public relations history of the Gospel Outreach in Guatemala has the “appearance of 
good, of fulfillment of a Christian commitment. This is what makes this whole project more insidious. 
The language is the rhetoric used by the Churches.”287 Ramírez connected the fear of spreading 
communism in Central America with evangelical missions. In doing so, he manipulated evangelical 
rhetoric to conceal the fact of mass killing of Mayan peoples. A warning—“Christians Beware! 
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Donations You Give May Kill People”—was issued by the newspaper providing indigenous people’s 
news, Akwesasne Notes, on December 31, 1982, which called for a boycott of International Love Lift. 
But the efforts continued. According to The Nation, as a result of evangelical efforts, on January 8, 
1983, the day the Reagan Administration announced that it had ended the five-year ban on military aide 
to Guatemala, shipment “more than $1 million worth of grain, clothing, medical supplies and building 
materials—not to mention 500,000 Spanish language Bibles” was sent for Guatemala.”288 All of this 
cargo had been collected by “American Fundamentalists, for whom the survival of the Ríos Montt 
regime” was tantamount.289 Most of the Love Lift supplies were destined for refugee camps in the Ixil 
Triangle, located in a mountainous region that was formerly a guerrilla stronghold. The shipments were 
part of Ríos Montt’s “Bullets and Beans” [Fujiles y Frijoles] rural pacification program.290 In addition, 
while Robertson’s offer never came to realize, “it enabled Ríos Montt to convince the U.S. Congress 
that he would not seek massive sums of U.S. aid. Instead, he would rely on ‘private aid’ from U.S. 
evangelicals.”291 This shows that the American evangelical movement was gaining in international 
influence and becoming a power within American foreign policy, thanks to both its unity and its 
abundant financial resources. For them, Ríos Montt arrived at just the right time. Investigative journalist 
Sara Diamond has shown how involvement in the Ríos Montt regime was important for American 
evangelicals ideologically and organizationally: 
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Mid-way through President Reagan’s first term, as Christian Right activists were realizing 
that some of Reagan’s promises—ending abortion, instituting school prayer, etc.—would 
not be fulfilled, the Ríos Montt period marked a turning point for the Christian Right. The 
Guatemalan experience, however vicarious, of a born-again Christian shepherding an entire 
nation reinforced a mentality within born-again circles that they could size the reigns of 
power and install—by force, if necessary—a “kingdom of God on earth.”292 
In other words, American evangelicals found a good way to fulfill their religious ambitions by 
supporting the Ríos Montt regime, which was attempting to reconstruct the nation based on Biblical 
principles while also fighting atheist communists. American evangelicals sought an outlet for their 
religious enthusiasm, which had not achieved in its goals with regard to domestic politics.  
Lastly, to address the question of why such a large number of Mayan peoples converted to 
Pentecostalism during Ríos Mont regime, despite harsh oppression by the army, we must recognize that 
there may have been very practical reasons for the phenomenon. Garrard-Burnet has offered two of 
them. One is “membership in a Protestant church seemed to offer some promise of protection against 
being killed by counterinsurgency forces, which viewed Catholics, but not Protestants, as the internal 
enemy.”293 The other “reason behind conversion most certainly had to do with the message and 
emphasis of Protestant, and particularly Pentecostal, theology, which promised solace and peace and 
helped to reorder the lives of people whose families, communities, and psyches had been ruined by 
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violence.”294 Under the Ríos Montt regime, Catholic Churches were considered hotbeds of leftist 
guerrilla activities and were subjected to scorched-earth campaigns that left many Catholic Action 
activists and catechists murdered. Mayan peoples in conflict zones were in danger if they were 
suspected to be guerrillas. Here is just one example: The New York Times reported on the experiences 
of Catholic nuns working in the highlands. “Indian women are now begging for ‘Ladino clothes,’ 
meaning non-Indian dresses,” they explained. These women were terrified “because their embroideries 
show what village they come from and, what’s more, these identify them Indians.”295 To be identified 
as Mayan was to be equated with guerrillas and to be attacked by the army. In this context, it is natural 
that such imminent danger may have led them to convert to Pentecostalism in order to protect their 
lives.  
The second answer to the question of conversion offered by Garrard-Burnett suggests a more 
paradoxical perspective: evangelicalism, which funded violence and death, also provided solace and 
peace. I speculate that this duality might have presented Mayan peoples with a harsh choice: to chose 
either conversion to evangelicalism to heal the trauma it had helped to create, or to reject it and become 
even more victimized in the process. This is a brutal division that the Mayan people have had to endure 
ever since the cessation of the conflict. This tragic situation reminds me of the statement of Ríos Montt 
made to the people of Guatemala upon the start of the coup that brought him into power: “only He 
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gives and takes away authority.”296 This is precisely what Ríos Montt did to the Mayan peoples, he 
took their “peace” and “solace,” and in return gave them his authority, as the savior of La Nueva 
Guatemala. 
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Conclusion 
Ríos Montt was ousted from power on August 8, 1983, by another military coup led by 
General Óscar Humberto Mejía Víctores. Mejía Víctores was just as intolerant of the rebels. He stated, 
“Guatemala does not need any more prayers [...], just more executions.”297 By this time, “the guerrillas 
were very much on the defensive. The coup [which toppled Ríos Montt] restored the authority of the 
military hierarchy, most of whom were also fed up with his stern Protestantism.”298 Nevertheless, Ríos 
Montt’s evangelical dictatorship was unprecedented in the history of Guatemalan politics. Ríos Montt 
may have been seen as a failure by military leaders who thought his fanatical religious leadership a 
nuisance, but the havoc he brought about went far beyond this. For example, Ríos Montt’s leadership 
failed the Guatemalan economy and ruined it as well. As Newsweek reported at the time: 
The beans-and-bullets campaign has helped strain Guatemala’s economy, which has 
traditionally been the strongest in Central America but is now suffering the worst crisis since 
the Depression. World prices for coffee, cotton and sugar are low, and the civil war has 
discouraged foreign tourism, once Guatemala’s fourth largest foreign-exchange earner.299 
Ríos Montt’s regime attempted to build a new nation, “La Nueva Guatemala,” on the basis of 
evangelical principles. This never came to pass. 
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 Even worse is the fact that Ríos Montt’s regime violated the human rights of the poor Mayan 
peoples of the Guatemalan highlands. Ríos Montt’s regime never exhibited any intention of actually 
addressing the inequality that defined the Guatemalan economy. The system that had been largely 
dependent on global capitalists—and specifically upon the United States—continued. It perpetuated 
extreme inequality, and was predicated on the exploitation of Mayan peoples. This system may have 
nurtured sympathy for communist guerrillas since the demise of Jacobo Árbenz’s regime, but Ríos 
Montt did nothing to change it.  
 In his attempt to combat communist guerrillas, Ríos Montt ignored the democratic process 
and used an evangelical rhetoric he shared with American evangelicals to justify his counterinsurgency 
campaigns. He organized and authorized the army to systematically eradicate people he deemed to be 
communist guerrillas, as well as their non-combatant sympathizers—mainly the Mayan peoples—by 
utilizing extreme violence, including attempted genocide. In short, Ríos Montt’s dictatorship reflected, 
and took advantage of, Cold War ideological fears. It also mobilized long-standing racism against the 
Mayan population. Ríos Montt’s evangelicalism, I have argued in this thesis, intensified both of these 
ideological campaigns. Furthermore, his dictatorship was supported by American evangelicals: it 
utilized their money and the support of their first president, Ronald Reagan.  
 During the American culture wars, American evangelicals asserted themselves against rising 
fears of losing traditional, Christian values. Evangelicals targeted global communism as an impediment 
to global evangelicalism. Televangelists such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson used their religious 
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influence to politically criticize liberal movements and secular humanism, including feminism and gay 
rights, which they described as enemies of morality and family values.  
Another remarkable component of this story is how the Jesus Movement and the 
counterculture came together to forge a new form of religious expression that later channeled the 
political aspirations of evangelicals. Christian thinker Francis Schaeffer played a pivotal role in bridging 
this new evangelical expression with the Christian Right. Schaeffer recognized that anti-abortion 
sentiment, for example, could become the focal point of domestic politics. In fact, the abortion issue 
became a catalyst to mobilize evangelicals to support Reagan in the 1980 election. Schaeffer insisted 
that Biblical principles should be incorporated into national politics, an idea that found receptive ears in 
the Republican camp and built a strong connection with them.  
Although Ronald Reagan advocated “Let’s Make America Great Again” to gain evangelical 
support during the election, he prioritized foreign policy more than domestic initiatives in order to boost 
the presence of the United States around the world. Ronald Reagan attempted to demonstrate the 
greatness of the United States to a world divided by capitalism and communism, but he regarded 
evangelicals merely as a source of votes, not necessarily as the holders of a doctrine to be applied to 
government. 
But to evangelicals religious doctrine was indeed the basis of a profound political theology. 
They pursued it in whatever ways they could. The 1976 Earthquake in Guatemala became for them an 
opportunity to become more invested materially, socially, and religiously outside the United States. It 
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was also used politically at home to lobby the government to help Guatemala. As a result of these 
efforts, well funded American evangelicals made inroads into Guatemalan society, especially its 
education system, to indoctrinate Guatemalans. It was an opportunity for them to preach evangelical 
principles, which emphasized individual responsibility and Protestant eschatology. Unfortunately, this 
indoctrination often de-emphasized critical thinking about social ills, such as poverty. It did not teach 
the importance of social reform, but instead emphasized obedience to authority. As a result, 
evangelicalism in Guatemala may have contributed to the covering-up of human rights violations by 
the army, which accordingly prolonged the civil war and the suffering of the Mayan peoples.  
 Even after he was deposed, Ríos Montt retained a strong ambition to return to national 
politics. Several years later, as the country returned to an elected government, many Guatemalans 
complained of “street crime and corruption by traditional politicians. Their frustration opened the door 
for Gen. Ríos Montt,” who had founded his own political party, the Guatemalan Republican Front 
(FRG) in 1989.300 Ríos Montt’s party “stressed law and order and individual responsibility,” utilizing 
the same political-theological rhetoric he was so fond of when he was president.301 But this time 
around Ríos Montt “refashioned himself as a civilian politician,” instead of a military leader.302 Ríos 
Montt claimed that Guatemalans still needed the “clean and powerful” leadership that he had tried to 
provide before. Despite his involvement with genocide, Ríos Montt’s status as an evangelical, along 
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“[w]ith support from many of the Mayan regions that had been ravaged by his troops,” helped get him 
“elected to Congress in 1990.”303  
Ríos Montt was supported by Mayan populations that embraced evangelicalism. It is 
possible that evangelical Mayans, because they were spared from the worst of the violence, may have 
accepted Ríos Montt’s arguments, which suggested that those who suffered from his policies were 
responsible for putting themselves at risk in the first place. But, even if many Mayan peoples did not 
believe this argument, they may have shared values Ríos Montt expressed during his dictatorship and 
his campaign. As I have argued, for Mayan peoples who converted to evangelical Protestantism, the 
indoctrination process resulted in political apathy. This apathy sometimes can be characterized by not 
voting, but more so by refraining from seeking solutions for social problems outside of a religious 
context. In other words, evangelical Mayans will vote in elections, but they will support the candidate 
that is the most evangelical, the one most in line with their values, regardless of the candidate’s past 
behavior. This is consistent with the strongly held evangelical doctrine of forgiving sin, especially if the 
person has accepted the evangelical concept of Jesus as their personal savior. This explains why 
evangelical Mayan peoples supported Ríos Montt, even though many of them were aware of the 
violence that he was responsible for. Ríos Montt was always careful to maintain his image as a saved 
evangelical Protestant. 
 As a member of Congress, Ríos Montt enjoyed immunity from prosecution. He tried twice 
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to run for president—in 1990 and 2003—but was blocked “by a constitutional clause that prevented 
anyone who had taken part in a military coup from becoming head of state.”304 Still, even though he 
never fulfilled his ambition of becoming an elected president, “he was for several years Guatemala’s 
most powerful politician behind the throne.”305 In comparison with former corrupt regimes, Ríos 
Montt’s image as clean, honest, and strong has endured for many evangelicals, even today. Ríos 
Montt’s image with evangelicals afforded him the privilege of not having to refute allegations of human 
rights violations, at least to his supporters. Ríos Montt has always maintained that he was just doing 
what needed to be done to save Guatemala. For evangelicals, even evangelical Mayan peoples who 
come from the places that suffered the most from his policies, Ríos Montt’s actions could be justified 
because he was trying to save them from an even great threat—communism. This, and the fact that he 
maintained good relations with evangelical leaders, allowed Ríos Montt to avoid publicly accepting 
blame for his roll in genocide 
 In spite, or perhaps because of his political failure, Ríos Montt became a capable 
image-creator. As Garrard-Burnett states, many people considered him “the embodiment of honesty, 
law and order, and national integrity.”306 But did non-evangelical Guatemalans buy this act? Newsweek 
reported on December 13, 1982: “The largely Catholic upper middle classes ridiculed Ríos Montt’s 
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religious fervor, and even some of his own officers referred to him as ‘the ayatollah.’”307 This article 
suggested that Ríos Montt’s evangelical fanaticism was a source of both criticism and critique. On the 
other hand, Ríos Montt won popularity among “workers, businessmen and women, who welcome his 
frequent appeals for sobriety and fidelity.”308 In addition, many middle-class Catholics were joining 
new fundamentalist sects with the same values to which Ríos Montt most often appealed.309 Could 
there have been any other reason why middle-class Catholics chose fundamentalism? Newsweek 
indicated one:  
In response to the papal mandate that Catholics must create “an option for the poor,” 
significant sectors of the Guatemalan clergy have become activists. As a result, many 
middle-and upper-class Catholics feel deserted by their church. “The church of the poor no 
longer speaks for the Catholics who have the misfortune to be rich,” complains one 
businessman in Guatemala City.310 
Middle-and upper-class Catholics, who were financially and socially more secure, were not pleased 
with being religiously marginalized. This antagonized their powerful religious aspirations. But it turned 
out that there was an option for the rich: fundamentalism. As a result, the rich became influential 
supporters of Ríos Montt’s regime. 
 The Newsweek article also suggested “The president has also won widespread support 
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among growing numbers of middle-class Indians. The bourgeois Indians believe that Ríos Montt is 
committed to upgrading their second-class status.”311 Actually, Ríos Montt appointed ten Mayans to 
the 30-member Council of State. But there was a pragmatic reason for this. As Ríos Montt confessed, 
“Neither the Army nor the guerrillas can win without the support of the Indios.”312 Ríos Montt’s aim 
was to obtain support from middle-class Mayan peoples. However, Ríos Montt’s pragmatic reasoning did 
not accept these people as equals. Just as Ríos Montt described God as generous, but fearful and powerful, to 
those who humbly submit to Him, Ríos Montt was treating the new middle-class Mayan in the same manner: 
“‘If you are with us, we’ll feed you, if not, we’ll kill you,’ he famously told a crowd of indigenous 
Maya in July 1982.”313 To the Mayan peoples who resisted Ríos Montt, he was wrathful, but to those who 
submitted to him, he was benevolent—so long as Mayan people remained in a subservient role. Ríos Montt 
maintained a strict dividing line between the ruling class, the Mayan peoples, and the internal enemy 
that should be eradicated. 
 After his time in the Congress came to an end, Ríos Montt was tried for human rights 
violations and genocide in January, 2013. He and his former chief of intelligence were charged with 
responsibility for massacres in 15 Ixil Maya villages, in which 1,771 unarmed men, women, and 
children were killed. After a five-month trial, Judge Yasmín Barrios said she was “completely 
convinced” of General Ríos Montt’s guilt. She sentenced him to 80 years in prison.314 This was an 
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epoch-making verdict, because “[i]t marked the first time that a former head of state had been convicted 
of genocide within his or her own country.”315 However, Ríos Montt never admitted his systematic 
commitment to perpetrating genocide against Mayan peoples. He dismissed the Catholic Church’s 
approved report Guatemala: Nunca Más! (Guatemala: Never Again!, 1998) edited by Recovery of the 
Historical Memory Project (REMHI), a human rights report that began under the leadership Catholic 
Bishop Juan Gerardi, who was later murdered. Ríos Montt declared the report a version of history 
“written by losers.”316 Ríos Montt claimed “he did not know what was happening on the ground, or 
that if there were atrocities, they were perpetrated by guerrillas or rouge troops.”317 He further insisted, 
“I did not engage in genocide […] I never authorized, never ordered an attack against a race, an 
ethnicity or a religion. I never did it!.”318 His opponents refuted him, saying: “[t]he army had 
sophisticated communications technology, and the way the massacres were carried out showed many 
common elements, that could only have come from a coordinated and centrally planned strategy.”319 
Despite convincing evidence that Ríos Montt was responsible for systematic efforts of brutal mass 
killing, torture, and rape against Mayan peoples, the conviction was later overturned. A retrial was 
scheduled and was under way in the early months of 2018. 
But on April 1, 2018, during his retrial, Ríos Montt died, age 91. Numerous media sources 
                                                                                                                                                       
New York Times, April 1, 2018,  
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/01/obituaries/efrain-rios-montt-guatemala-dead.html 
315 Otis, The Washington Post, April 1, 2018. 
316 Painter, Independent, April 2, 2018. 
317 Ibid. 
318 Otis, The Washington Post, April 1, 2018. 
319 Painter, Independent, April 2, 2018. 
 104 
reported his death in conjunction with the brutal side of his dictatorship. Ríos Montt was described as a 
“born-again butcher” and as the “Pol Pot” of Guatemala.320 As Reuters pointed out, “[c]ritics likened 
Ríos Montt to other Latin American presidents who ruled with an iron hand, like Chile’s Augusto 
Pinochet and Peru’s Alberto Fujimori.”321 It is true that Ríos Montt was a military man who shared a 
hard-line anticommunist position with them. However, at the same time, Ríos Montt was “a maverick 
politician, who did not fit the usual models for Latin America.”322  
Ríos Montt’s peculiar, evangelical dictatorship was symbolized by his unique rhetoric. For 
example, he liked to say “a true Christian carried the Bible in one hand and a rifle in the other.”323 Ríos 
Montt was a military dictator who thought of himself as a divinely ordained president. Because his 
actions and policies were always explained within a self-assured, evangelical context, for Ríos Montt, 
there was no contradiction between God’s principles and brutal violence. Ríos Montt believed only his 
most loyal and fellow evangelical followers and God could judge his political decisions. This shows 
how willingly Ríos Montt utilized violence to accomplish his own interpretation of God’s mission to 
build “La Nueva Guatemala.”  
This attitude indicates the danger of religious commitments in politics, especially when they 
are applied to military projects. An analysis by The Herald of the reasons which led to Ríos Montt’s 
ouster concludes that he was blamed by many business people for the bad economy and had so upset 
                                                
320 Otis, The Washington Post, April 1, 2018. 
321 Menchu, Reuters, April 1, 2018. 
322 Painter, Independent, April 2, 2018. 
323 Kinzer, The New York Times, April 1, 2018. 
 105 
the military hierarchy with his religious leadership that the putsch against him was “headed by his own 
defence [sic] minister”324 But what is most telling is that many Catholics on all sides agreed that Ríos 
Montt’s “fervent Protestantism” aggravated the situation.325 
After Ríos Montt’s dictatorship, American evangelical involvement in Central America 
continued. In fact, it increased. “America’s ‘Christian Right’ has emerged as a major religious and 
political influence in Honduras, forming the foundation for private, humanitarian aid to the Contra 
rebels and their families.”326 As was reported in 1987: 
Private evangelical relief organizations, including Danforth’s $3million-a-year program and 
William Murray’s $3 million Freedom’s Friends operation report they have poured more 
than $10 million in private aid into Honduras in the past two years. The aid helps local 
churches, refugees from Nicaragua and contra soldiers.327 
 The effects from the connection between Reagan-era Republicans and evangelicals 
continued after Ronald Reagan left office. During President George W. Bush’s administration, further 
efforts to spread the influence of American evangelicalism in Latin America, and elsewhere, were 
initiated by former Reagan administration official, Michael Horowitz. His efforts helped to begin a 
“grass-roots movement” that has “galvanized interest in global issues among America’s growing ranks 
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of evangelical Christians.”328 George W. Bush was an even more pro-evangelical president than 
Reagan, because under the Bush administration many foreign issues that concerned evangelicals were 
pursued, including The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, the U.S. effort to end the Sudanese 
Civil War, in 2005, and increasing the funding for the Trafficking Protections Act in 2006.329 In 2006, 
as a result of President Bush’s support, the Council on Foreign Relation’s vice president and director of 
its Washington program, Nancy E. Roman, predicted that this pattern of activism by evangelicals was 
likely to intensify. “I think in general the Southern Baptist Convention and other organized groups of 
evangelicals have decided that really it’s important to engage politically and certainly in the foreign 
policy realm,” Roman said. “By sheer dint of the numbers, I think the evangelicals are having more of a 
measurable impact right now” than other religious groups.330 But there is a negative side to 
evangelicalism’s intensifying activism, because some prominent evangelical leaders, including 
Reverend Franklin Graham, son of Billy Graham, stated after the 9/11 attacks that Islam was a “very 
evil and a very wicked religion.”331 Richard Land, head of the Southern Baptist Convention’s public 
policy arm, remarked in 2005 that “many evangelicals too easily equate radical Islamic jihadism with 
Islam,” yet he was unwilling to completely denounce what Franklin Graham had publicly stated.332 
Many evangelicals still articulate a strong antagonism towards Islam, which seems to have become the 
                                                
328 Peter Waldman, “Evangelicals Give U.S. Foreign Policy An Activist Tinge,” The Wall Street 
Journal, May 26, 2004, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB108552288320121114 
329 Robert McMahon, “Christian Evangelicals and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Council on Foreign Relations, 
August 22, 2006, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/christian-evangelicals-and-us-foreign-policy 
330 Ibid. 
331 Ibid. 
332 Ibid. 
 107 
new communism of the twenty-first century. Perhaps after the end of communism, evangelicals have 
moved on to another flash points, to other political-theological conflicts dividing the world politically 
and religiously. 
 The connections between evangelicals and government have deepened with the election of 
President Donald. J. Trump. His most important evangelical supporter is Franklin Graham, who has 
enthusiastically supported President Trump, even after many racist comments made by the president. 
Franklin Graham has said of President Trump: “I can’t think of anything mean he’s said. I think he 
speaks what he feels.”333  
 For his unwavering support, Franklin Graham has been rewarded by President Trump. He 
“is among the evangelical pastors who serve as informal advisers to Mr. Trump and Vice President 
Mike Pence.”334 As a result of this close association, “Mr. Trump has delivered for evangelicals on 
every issue — from abortion, to religious freedom to vowing to abolish the Johnson Amendment that 
inhibits churches from endorsing politicians.”335 As Graham puts it: 
In my lifetime, he has supported the Christian faith more than any president that I know […] 
That doesn’t mean he is the greatest example of the Christian faith, and neither am I, but he 
defends the faith. There’s a difference between defending the faith and living the faith.336 
                                                
333 Laurie Goodstein, “Billy Graham Warned Against Embracing a President. His Son Has Gone 
Another Way,” The New York Times, February 26, 2018,  
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/us/billy-graham-franklin-graham-trump.html 
334 Ibid. 
335 Ibid. 
336 Ibid. 
 108 
Even though, Franklin Graham recognizes that President Trump is not a good example of 
the Christian faith, he still believes that evangelicals should support President Trump because he 
“defends the faith.” This distinction between “defending” the faith and “living” the faith is the same as 
the one utilized by evangelical Mayan peoples who supported Ríos Montt when he returned to national 
politics. In light of these similarities, exhibited by evangelicals separated by culture and nearly forty 
years, I suggest that many evangelicals in the United States today are exhibiting a similar form of 
political apathy that the evangelical Mayan peoples exhibited when they supported Ríos Montt.  
 As I have argued in this thesis, there is a strain of evangelical belief that can be found in Ríos 
Montt that intensified political violence in Guatemala. This was supported by American evangelicalism. 
Both Ríos Montt and American evangelicals did not care about the violence against Mayan peoples, 
because both were concerned primarily with the conversion of the Mayan peoples to evangelicalism. 
Ríos Montt claimed that salvation is through God, but of course this meant only a Christian concept of 
God. Ríos Montt argued this was the only way to defeat communist rebels in Guatemala. Communists 
were also regarded by President Ronald Reagan and American evangelicals as being opposed to God 
and God’s values. Therefore, they agreed with this characterization of communism and fully supported 
Ríos Montt’s reasoning and his methods. Ronald Reagan and American evangelicals applied the same 
reasoning that Franklin Graham is using today, the one Ríos Montt used to “defend” the Christian faith.  
 This strain of evangelicalism, which Ríos Montt exhibited and American evangelicals 
supported, is characterized by intolerance towards non-Christians. Even though the 1976 earthquake in 
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Guatemala inspired American evangelicals to help the Mayan peoples, American evangelicals did not 
try to understand the complexity of the Guatemalan Civil War, in order to better help its victims. 
Instead, racism and economic inequality against the Mayan peoples were ignored and the Mayan 
peoples themselves were held responsible for their own salvation. This meant that the long history of 
racism and economic inequality against Mayan peoples did not matter for American evangelicals any 
more than it did for Ríos Montt. Both did nothing to relieve this form of suffering, unless the Mayan 
peoples first converted and became evangelical—especially Pentecostal. However, one thing we must 
bear in mind is that the conversion to evangelicalism did not always protect Mayan peoples from 
political violence. Garrard-Burnett points out, “the reality of Ríos Montt’s ‘war against the Antichrist’ 
in fact knew few religious boundaries, as the substantial number of Protestants who fled their villages 
or died at the hands of the army alongside their Catholic brethren.”337 This was because particularly 
traditional non-Pentecostal Churches.  
While evangélicos in general did not share the same theological motivations as Catholics, 
some Protestants, particularly non-Pentecostals, did join the armed movement for religious 
reasons. This was especially true of activists from the historic churches—that is, the older 
missionary-based, non Pentecostal denominations—who, like Catholic radicals, could no 
longer see any option for social justice outside of revolution.338  
Although their number was not many, some of them even joined the guerrilla movement. So the army 
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targeted some Protestant Churches as potential internal enemies as well. Still, “Protestants, taken as a 
group, suffered far less in the counterinsurgency than Catholics.”339 The fact that so many Mayan 
peoples who converted were less persecuted by the government may have strengthened the desire to 
convert. For poor Mayan peoples, it was probably the only nonviolent method—which did not cost 
money, or force them to leave their homes—for coping with the violence of the Guatemalan Civil War. 
 The legacy of Francis Schaeffer continues to affect the connections between evangelicals 
and politicians. Although Schaeffer is most often remembered for his argument that secular humanism 
is the enemy of Christian based intellectualism, it is his identification of abortion as the key issue that 
would galvanize evangelical political mobilization, which has had the most lasting influence. What 
emerged out of the culture wars is the search for key political issues that would unite evangelicals. This 
also led to identifying weaknesses in their opponents. Ríos Montt is a perfect example of how religious 
politicians have used key issues to unite support for themselves and demonize the opposition. Ríos 
Montt’s political theology was an early form of the political theology that is currently present in the 
United States. In conclusion, I suggest Ríos Montt’s political theology was more successfully 
implemented than Ronald Reagan’s, because Ríos Montt was able to impose more control over the 
education and indoctrination of the Mayan peoples, which includes his policy of genocide. Furthermore, 
Ríos Montt was able to continue as a politician, even after he was deposed by his own army, and avoid 
prosecution while he was a member of the Guatemalan congress. And still, Ríos Montt was supported 
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by the very Mayan peoples that his policy of genocide targeted. All of this Ríos Montt was able to do as 
a dictator, then later as a politician, without ever publicly apologizing for genocide. 
It is my contention that to further understand the complicit relationship between dictatorship 
and religion, there should be more studies comparing Ríos Montt’s dictatorship with other religious 
dictators and politicians. I believe this would give us different perspectives on the connection between 
religion and politics. I also think that such comparisons will help to reveal how the relationship between 
religion and politics in the Americas has developed or changed since Ríos Montt’s dictatorship.  
Because the Gospel Outreach was so instrumental connecting Ríos Montt to American 
evangelical support, study of other connections between religion and politics might also identify other 
religious organizations that have played the same role that Gospel Outreach played in Ríos Montt’s 
dictatorship. Perhaps further study will be make clear how religious movements themselves have 
changed to become more political and, unhappily, more extreme. In this thesis I have attempted to 
identify some of those changes through the language and politics that Ríos Montt and Ronald Reagan 
shared. The transformations of Gospel Outreach and the Jesus Movement in the United Sates are 
examples of politicized religion. The changes they underwent were conservative and extreme, perfectly 
suited for conservative and extreme politicians like Ríos Montt and Ronald Reagan. But these changes 
had painful consequences for the Mayan peoples of Guatemala. 
Caught in the crossfire of these conflicts where the Mayan peoples of Guatemala. They have 
been oppressed by rulers under the name of “their God” not “our God” from the colonial era to the 
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present. Until this changes, religion, like politics, will be little more than a survival strategy for the 
Mayan peoples of Guatemala. This may seem sufficient during cruel and heartless times, but instead of 
improving the lives of the suffering Mayan peoples it ensures their continued oppression.
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